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 Abstract
We estimate productivities at the sector level for 72 countries and 5 decades, and exam-
ine how they evolve over time in both developed and developing countries. In both 
country groups, comparative advantage has become weaker: productivity grew system-
atically faster in sectors that were initially at greater comparative disadvantage. These 
changes have had a signicant impact on trade volumes and patterns, and a non-negligible 
welfare impact. In the counterfactual scenario in which each country’s comparative 
advantage remained the same as in the 1960s, and technology in all sectors grew at 
the same country-specic average rate, trade volumes would be higher, cross-country 
export patterns more dissimilar, and intra-industry trade lower than in the data. In this 
counterfactual scenario, welfare is also 1.6% higher for the median country compared 
to the baseline. The welfare impact varies greatly across countries, ranging from −1.1% 
to +4.3% among OECD countries, and from −4.6% to +41.9% among non-OECD coun-
tries.
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I. Introduction
How does technology evolve over time? This question is important in many
contexts, most notably in economic growth and international trade. Much of the
economic growth literature focuses on absolute technological differences between
countries. In the context of the one-sector model common in this literature, tech-
nological progress is unambiguously beneficial. Indeed, one reading of the growth
literature is that most of the cross-country income differences are accounted for
by technology, broadly construed (Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and
Jones, 1999).
By contrast, the Ricardian tradition in international trade emphasizes relative
technological differences as the reason for international exchange and gains from
trade. In the presence of multiple industries and comparative advantage, the
welfare consequences of technological improvements depend crucially on which
sectors experience productivity growth. For instance, it is well known that when
productivity growth is biased towards sectors in which a country has a compara-
tive disadvantage, the country and its trading partners may experience a welfare
loss, relative to the alternative under which growth is balanced across sectors.
Greater relative technological differences lead to larger gains from trade, and
thus welfare could be reduced when countries become more similar to each other.
This result goes back to at least Hicks (1953), and has been reiterated recently by
Samuelson (2004) in the context of productivity growth in developing countries.1
To fully account for the impact of technological progress on economic outcomes,
we must thus understand not only the evolution of average country-level TFP,
but also the evolution of relative technology across sectors. Or, in the vocabulary
of international trade, it is important to know what happens to both absolute and
comparative advantage. Until now the literature has focused almost exclusively
on estimating differences in technology at the country level. This paper examines
the evolution of comparative advantage over time and its implications. Using
a large-scale industry-level dataset on production and bilateral trade, spanning
1Other papers that explore technological change in Ricardian models are, among many others, Jones
(1979), Krugman (1979), Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), and Hymans and Stafford (1995).
272 countries, 19 manufacturing sectors, and 5 decades, we estimate productivity
in each country, sector, and decade, and document the changes in comparative
advantage between the 1960s and today. We then use these estimates in a multi-
sector Ricardian model of production and trade to quantify the implications of
changing comparative advantage on global trade patterns and welfare.2
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find strong evidence
that comparative advantage has become weaker over time. Controlling for the
average productivity growth of all sectors in a country, sectors that had a larger
initial comparative disadvantage grew systematically faster. This effect is present
in all time periods, and is similar in magnitude in both developed and developing
countries. The speed of convergence in sectoral productivities implied by the
estimates is about 18% per decade.
Second, weakening comparative advantage is important for understanding the
evolution of trade volumes and trade patterns. Our quantitative exercise begins
by solving the full model under the actually observed pattern of comparative
advantage, and computing all the relevant model outcomes under this baseline
case. We then compare the baseline to a counterfactual scenario in which each
country’s sectoral productivities grow at the same average rate observed between
the 1960s and the 2000s, but its comparative advantage remains as it was in the
1960s. Because we allow average productivity to grow, this exercise isolates the
role of changes in comparative – as opposed to absolute – advantage.
The baseline matches the average trade/GDP ratios observed in the data well.
In the counterfactual of unchanged comparative advantage, however, trade vol-
umes as a share of GDP are 15% higher in the 2000s, implying that the rise in
trade volumes over the past 5 decades would have been even higher had compar-
ative advantage not weakened.
Changes in comparative advantage have had an impact on trade patterns as
well. We document that in the data, trade patterns became substantially more
similar across countries. In the majority of sectors, the standard deviation of (log)
2Technically, the term “comparative advantage” refers to the comparison of autarky prices (Deardorff,
1980), and thus encompasses all determinants of relative production cost differences. To streamline
exposition, this paper uses “comparative advantage” as a short-hand for “relative sectoral productivity
differences,” i.e., the Ricardian component of comparative advantage.
3world export shares across countries has fallen significantly between the 1960s
and the 2000s. In addition, over the same period there has been a substantial
increase in intra-industry trade (measured here by the Grubel-Lloyd index). As
our baseline model is implemented on observed trade flows, it matches these
two patterns very well. By contrast, the counterfactual experiment in which
comparative advantage is fixed implies a much smaller reduction in the dispersion
in world export shares, and a much smaller increase in intra-industry trade than
observed in the data.
Finally, these changes in comparative advantage had an appreciable welfare
impact. In the counterfactual scenario of unchanging comparative advantage, in
the 2000s the median country’s welfare would be 1.6% higher than in the base-
line. This median welfare impact amounts to nearly 25% of the median gains
from trade relative to autarky implied by the model, which are 6.6%. Moreover,
there is a great deal of variation around this average: the percentage difference
between welfare under this counterfactual and the baseline ranges from −1.1% to
+4.3% among OECD countries, and from −4.6% to +41.9% among non-OECD
countries. The cross-country dispersion in the welfare impact of changing com-
parative advantage is similar to the dispersion in the implied gains from trade.
Lower average welfare is exactly what theory would predict, given the empirical
result that a typical country’s comparative advantage has become weaker over
this period.
To estimate productivity, the paper extends the methodology developed by
Eaton and Kortum (2002) to a multi-sector framework. It is important to empha-
size the advantages of our approach relative to the standard neoclassical method-
ology of computing measured TFP. The basic difficulty in directly measuring
sectoral TFP in a large sample of countries and over time is the lack of compa-
rable data on real sectoral output and inputs.3 By contrast, our procedure uses
3To our knowledge, the most comprehensive database that can be used to measure sectoral TFP
on a consistent basis across countries and time is the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. It
contains the required information on only 12 developed countries for the period 1970-2008 in the best of
cases, but upon closer inspection it turns out that the time and sectoral coverage is poor even in that
small set of countries. Appendix A builds measured TFPs using the STAN database, and compares them
to our estimates. There is a high positive correlation between the two, providing additional support for
the validity of the estimates in this paper.
4information on bilateral trade, and thus dramatically expands the set of countries,
sectors, and time periods for which productivity can be estimated. We follow the
insight of Eaton and Kortum (2002) that trade flows contain information on pro-
ductivity. Intuitively, if controlling for the typical gravity determinants of trade,
a country spends relatively more on domestically produced goods in a particular
sector, it is revealed to have either a high relative productivity or a low relative
unit cost in that sector. We then use data on factor and intermediate input prices
to net out the role of factor costs, yielding an estimate of relative productivity.
In addition, our approach extends the basic multi-sector Eaton-Kortum frame-
work to incorporate many features that are important for reliably estimating
underlying technology: multiple factors of production (labor and capital), differ-
ences in factor and intermediate input intensities across sectors, a realistic input-
output matrix between the sectors, both inter- and intra-sectoral trade, and a
non-traded sector. Finally, because our framework allows for international trade
driven by both Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin forces, it takes explicit account of
each country’s participation in exports and imports, both of the final output, and
of intermediate inputs used in production.
We are not the first to use international trade data to estimate technology pa-
rameters. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Waugh (2010) perform this analysis in
a one-sector model at a point in time, an exercise informative of the cross-section
of countries’ overall TFP but not their comparative advantage.4 Shikher (2011,
2012) and Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) estimate sectoral technol-
ogy for OECD countries, while Caliendo and Parro (2014) analyze the impact of
NAFTA in a multi-sector Eaton-Kortum model. Hsieh and Ossa (2011) examine
the global welfare impact of sector-level productivity growth in China between
1993 and 2005, focusing on the uneven growth across sectors. Chor (2010) relates
Ricardian productivity differences to observable characteristics of countries, such
as institutions and financial development. Relative to existing contributions, we
extend the multi-sector approach to a much greater set of countries, and, most
importantly, over time. This allows us, for the first time, to examine not only
4Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2009) estimate the evolution of overall manufacturing TFP between
1985 and 2002 using a one-sector Eaton and Kortum model.
5the global cross-section of productivities, but also their evolution over the past
5 decades and the implications of those changes. While existing papers in this
literature employ static models, our quantitative framework features endogenous
capital accumulation, and thus permits modeling the joint evolution of compar-
ative advantage and the capital stock. We show that the response of the capital
stock to changes in comparative advantage has an appreciable welfare impact.
Changes in productivity at the sector level have received comparatively less
attention in the literature. Bernard and Jones (1996a,b) use production data
to study convergence of measured TFP in a sample of 15 OECD countries and 8
sectors, while Rodrik (2013) investigates convergence in value added per worker in
an expanded sample of countries. Proudman and Redding (2000) and Hausmann
and Klinger (2007) examine changes in countries’ revealed comparative advantage
and how these are related to initial export patterns. Our paper is the first to use
a fully specified model of production and trade to estimate changes in underlying
TFP. In addition, we greatly expand the sample of countries and years relative to
these studies, and use our quantitative framework to compute the impact of the
estimated changes in comparative advantage on trade volumes, trade patterns,
and welfare.
Our paper is also related to the literature that documents the time evolution
of diversification indices, be it of production (e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003), or
trade (e.g. Carre`re, Cadot and Strauss-Kahn, 2011). These studies typically find
that countries have a tendency to diversify their production and exports as they
grow, at least until they become quite developed. Our findings of weakening com-
parative advantage are consistent with greater diversification, and hence provide
a structural interpretation for the evolution of these indices.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the theoretical
framework. Section III presents the estimation procedure and the data. Section
IV describes the patterns of the evolution of comparative advantage over time,
and presents the main econometric results of the paper on relative convergence.
5Our paper is also related to the literature on international technology diffusion, surveyed by Keller
(2004). While we document large and systematic changes in technology over time, our approach is, for
now, silent on the mechanisms behind these changes. Section IV.C relates our empirical results to the
theoretical literature on technology adoption and diffusion.
6Section V examines the quantitative implications of the observed evolution of
comparative advantage. Section VI concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
The world is comprised of N countries and J + 1 sectors. Each sector produces
a continuum of goods. The first J sectors are tradeable subject to trade costs,
and sector (J + 1) is nontradeable. There are two factors of production, labor
and capital. Both are mobile across sectors and immobile across countries. Trade
is balanced each period, and thus we abstract from international asset markets.
All agents have perfect foresight and all markets are competitive.
A. Households
In period t = 0, the representative household in country n is endowed with cap-
ital Kn0 and labor Ln0. Each period, the household saves an exogenous fraction
snt of its current income (as in Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956), investing it into next
period’s capital, and consumes the remaining fraction 1 − snt. The saving rates
are country-specific and time-varying.6
Period utility of the representative consumer in country n is given by U (Cnt),
where Cnt denotes aggregate consumption in country n and period t. The function
U(·) satisfies all the usual regularity conditions. The flow budget constraint of
the household in period t is given by
(1) Pnt (Cnt + Int) = PntYnt = wntLnt + rntKnt,
where Pnt is the price of aggregate consumption, Int is flow saving/investment,
Ynt is aggregate final output, Knt is the capital stock, Lnt is the effective labor
endowment, and wnt and rnt are the wage rate and the rental return to capital,
respectively. The budget constraint implicitly imposes that international trade is
balanced in each period. Since investment Int is simply sntYnt, the law of motion
6The variation in snt is meant to capture the influence of demographics, economic growth rates,
market frictions, and distortions or subsidies to savings and/or investment due to government policy, or
other underlying fundamental differences across countries and over time.
7for capital is given by
(2) Knt+1 = (1− δnt)Knt + sntYnt,
where δnt is the country-specific and time-varying depreciation rate.
The aggregate final output Ynt is an aggregate of sectoral composite goods:
(3) Ynt =
 J∑
j=1
ω
1
η
j
(
Y jnt
) η−1
η

η
η−1 ξnt (
Y J+1nt
)1−ξnt
,
where Y jnt is the composite good in tradeable sector j, and Y
J+1
nt is the nontradeable-
sector composite good. The parameter ξnt is thus the Cobb-Douglas weight on
the tradeable sector composite good, η is the elasticity of substitution between
the tradeable sectors, and ωj is the taste parameter for tradeable sector j. The
expenditure share on tradeables ξnt varies over time as well as across countries,
to capture in a reduced-form way the positive relationship between income and
the non-tradeable consumption share observed in the data. The aggregate (con-
sumption) price index in country n and period t is thus:
Pnt = Bn
 J∑
j=1
ωj(p
j
nt)
1−η
 11−η ξnt (pJ+1nt )1−ξnt ,
where Bn = ξ
−ξnt
nt (1− ξnt)−(1−ξnt) and pjnt is the price of the sector j composite.
B. Firms
Output in each sector j and country n and period t is produced using a CES
production function that aggregates a continuum of varieties q ∈ [0, 1] unique to
each sector:
Qjnt =
[∫ 1
0
Qjnt(q)
ε−1
ε dq
] ε
ε−1
,
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties q, Qjnt is the total
sector j output in country n, and Qjnt(q) is the amount of variety q that is used
8in production. It is well known that the price of sector j’s output is given by:
pjnt =
[∫ 1
0
pjnt(q)
1−εdq
] 1
1−ε
,
where pjnt(q) is the price of variety q in sector j and country n.
The production function of each sectoral variety q is:
yjnt(q) = z
j
nt(q)
(
kjnt(q)
1−αj ljnt(q)
αj
)βj J+1∏
j′=1
mj
′j
nt (q)
γj′j
1−βj ,
where zjnt(q) denotes variety-specific productivity, k
j
nt(q) and l
j
nt(q) denote inputs
of capital and labor, and mj
′j
nt denotes the intermediate input from sector j
′ used
in producing sector-j goods. The value-added based labor intensity is given by
αj , while the share of value added in total output is given by βj . Both of these
vary by sector. The weights on inputs from other sectors, γj′j , vary by output
industry j as well as input industry j′.
Productivity zjnt(q) for each q ∈ [0, 1] in each sector j and period t is equally
available to all agents in country n, and product and factor markets are perfectly
competitive. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002, henceforth EK), the produc-
tivity draw zjnt(q) is random and comes from the Fre´chet distribution with the
cumulative distribution function
F jnt(z) = e
−T jntz−θ .
In this distribution, the absolute advantage term T jnt varies by country, sector,
and time, with higher values of T jnt implying higher average productivity draws
in sector j in country n and period t. The parameter θ captures dispersion, with
larger values of θ implying smaller dispersion in draws.
It will be convenient to define the cost of an “input bundle” faced by sector j
producers in country n:
cjnt =
(
w
αj
nt r
1−αj
nt
)βj J+1∏
j′=1
(
pj
′
nt
)γj′j1−βj .
9Then, producing one unit of good q in sector j in country n requires 1
zjnt(q)
input
bundles, and thus the cost of producing one unit of good q is cjnt/z
j
nt(q).
International trade is subject to iceberg costs: in order for one unit of good q
produced in sector j to arrive in country n from country i in period t, djnit > 1
units of the good must be shipped. We normalize djnnt = 1 for each country n
and period t in each tradeable sector j. Note that the trade costs will vary by
destination pair, by sector, and time, and need not be directionally symmetric:
djnit need not equal d
j
int. Under perfect competition, the price at which country i
can supply tradeable good q in sector j to country n is equal to:
pjnit(q) =
(
cjit
zjit(q)
)
djnit.
Buyers of each good q in tradeable sector j in country n and period t will select
to buy from the cheapest source country. Thus, the price actually paid for this
good in country n will be:
pjnt(q) = min
i=1,...,N
{
pjnit(q)
}
.
Following the standard EK approach, define the “multilateral resistance” term
Φjnt =
N∑
i=1
T jit
(
cjitd
j
nit
)−θ
.
This value summarizes, for country n and time t, the access to production tech-
nologies in sector j. Its value will be higher if in sector j, country n’s trading
partners have high productivity (T jit) or low costs (c
j
it). It will also be higher if
the trade costs that country n faces in this sector are low. Standard steps lead
to the familiar result that the probability of importing good q in sector j from
country i in period t, pijnit, is equal to the share of total spending on goods coming
from country i, Xjnit/X
j
nt, and is given by:
Xjnit
Xjnt
= pijnit =
T jit
(
cjitd
j
nit
)−θ
Φjnt
.
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In addition, the price of good j in country n and period t is simply
(4) pjnt = Γ
(
Φjnt
)− 1
θ
,
where Γ =
[
Γ
(
θ+1−ε
θ
)] 1
1−ε , and Γ is the Gamma function.
C. Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this model world economy consists of se-
quences of prices, allocation rules, and trade shares such that (i) given the prices,
all firms’ inputs satisfy the first-order conditions, and their output is given by the
production function; (ii) the households’ aggregate consumption and investment
decisions are consistent with the exogenous saving rates, and their sectoral de-
mands satisfy the first order conditions given the prices; (iii) the prices ensure the
market clearing conditions for labor, capital, tradeable goods and nontradeable
goods; (iv) trade shares ensure balanced trade for each country.
The set of prices includes the wage rate wnt, the rental rate rnt, the sectoral
prices {pjnt}J+1j=1 , and the aggregate price Pnt in each country n and period t.
The allocation rules include aggregate consumption Cnt, investment Int, capital
Knt, the capital and labor allocation across sectors {Kjnt, Ljnt}J+1j=1 , final demand
{Y jnt}J+1j=1 , and total demand {Qjnt}J+1j=1 (both final and intermediate goods) for
each sector. The trade shares include the expenditure shares pijnit in country n on
goods coming from country i in sector j.
Characterization of Equilibrium
Given the set of prices {wnt, rnt, Pnt, {pjnt}J+1j=1 }Nn=1, we first characterize the opti-
mal sectoral allocations from final demand. Consumers maximize utility subject
to the budget constraint (1), (2), and (3). The first order conditions associated
with this optimization problem imply the following final demand across sectors:
(5) pjntY
j
nt = ξnt(wntLnt + rntKnt)
ωj(p
j
nt)
1−η∑J
k=1 ωk(p
k
nt)
1−η , for all j = {1, .., J}
11
and
pJ+1nt Y
J+1
nt = (1− ξnt)(wntLnt + rntKnt).
We next characterize the production and factor allocations across the world. Let
Qjnt denote the total sectoral demand in country n and sector j in period t. Q
j
nt
is used for both final demand and intermediate inputs in domestic production of
all sectors. That is,
pjntQ
j
nt = p
j
ntY
j
nt +
J∑
j′=1
(1− βj′)γjj′
(
N∑
i=1
pij
′
intp
j′
itQ
j′
it
)
+ (1− βJ+1)γj,J+1pJ+1nt QJ+1nt .
Total expenditure in sector j = 1, ..., J + 1 of country n, pjntQ
j
nt, is the sum of (i)
domestic final consumption expenditure pjntY
j
nt; (ii) expenditure on sector j goods
as intermediate inputs in all the traded sectors
∑J
j′=1(1−βj′)γjj′
(∑N
i=1 pi
j′
intp
j′
itQ
j′
it
)
,
and (iii) expenditure on intermediate inputs from sector j in the domestic non-
traded sector (1− βJ+1)γj,J+1pJ+1nt QJ+1nt . These market clearing conditions sum-
marize the two important features of the world economy captured by our model:
complex international production linkages, as much of world trade is in interme-
diate inputs, and a good crosses borders multiple times before being consumed
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001); and two-way input linkages between the tradeable
and the nontradeable sectors.
In each tradeable sector j, some goods q are imported from abroad and some
goods q are exported to the rest of the world. Country n’s exports in sector j and
period t are given by EXjnt =
∑N
i=1 1Ii 6=npi
j
intp
j
itQ
j
it, and its imports in sector j are
given by IM jnt =
∑N
i=1 1Ii 6=npi
j
nitp
j
ntQ
j
nt, where 1Ii 6=n is the indicator function. The
total exports of country n are then EXnt =
∑J
j=1EX
j
nt, and total imports are
IMnt =
∑J
j=1 IM
j
nt. Trade balance requires that for every country n and time t,
EXnt − IMnt = 0.
We now characterize the factor allocations across sectors. The total production
revenue in tradeable sector j in country n and period t is given by
∑N
i=1 pi
j
intp
j
itQ
j
it.
The optimal sectoral factor allocations in country n and tradeable sector j in
12
period t must thus satisfy
N∑
i=1
pijintp
j
itQ
j
it =
wntL
j
nt
αjβj
=
rntK
j
nt
(1− αj)βj .
For the nontradeable sector J + 1, the optimal factor allocations in country n are
simply given by
pJ+1nt Q
J+1
nt =
wntL
J+1
nt
αJ+1βJ+1
=
rntK
J+1
nt
(1− αJ+1)βJ+1 .
Finally, the feasibility conditions for factors are given by, for any n,
J+1∑
j=1
Ljnt = Lnt and
J+1∑
j=1
Kjnt = Knt.
Given all of the model parameters, factor endowments, trade costs, and produc-
tivities, the model is solved using the algorithm described in Appendix B.
III. Estimating Model Parameters
This section estimates the sector-level technology parameters T jnt for a large
set of countries and 5 decades in three steps. First, we estimate the technology
parameters in the tradeable sectors relative to the U.S. using data on sectoral
output and bilateral trade. The procedure relies on fitting a structural gravity
equation implied by the model. This step also produces estimates of bilateral
trade costs at the sector level over time. Second, we estimate the technology
parameters in the tradeable sectors for the U.S.. This procedure requires directly
measuring sectoral TFP using data on real output and inputs, and then correcting
measured TFP for selection due to trade. The taste parameters for all tradeable
sectors ωj are also calibrated in this step. Third, the nontradeable technology is
calibrated to match the PPP income per capita in the data.
The calibration of the remaining parameters is more straightforward. Some
parameters – αj , βj , γj′j , snt, ξnt, Lnt, and Knt – come directly from the data. For
a small number of parameters – θ, η, and ε – we take values estimated elsewhere
in the literature. Sections III.A and III.B describe the estimation of sectoral
technology, and Section III.C discusses the data sources used in the estimation as
13
well as the choice of the other parameters.
A. Tradeable Sector Relative Technology
Following the standard EK approach, first divide trade shares by their domestic
counterpart:
pijnit
pijnnt
=
Xjnit
Xjnnt
=
T jit
(
cjitd
j
nit
)−θ
T jnt
(
cjnt
)−θ ,
which in logs becomes:
ln
(
Xjnit
Xjnnt
)
= ln
(
T jit(c
j
it)
−θ
)
− ln
(
T jnt(c
j
nt)
−θ
)
− θ ln djnit.
Let the (log) iceberg costs be given by the following expression:
ln djnit = d
j
k,t + b
j
nit + CU
j
nit + RTA
j
nit + ex
j
it + ν
j
nit,
where djk,t is the contribution to trade costs of the distance between n and i
being in a certain interval (indexed by k). Following EK, we set the distance
intervals, in miles, to [0, 350], [350, 750], [750, 1500], [1500, 3000], [3000, 6000],
[6000, maximum). Additional variables are whether the two countries share a
common border (which changes the trade costs by bjnit), belong to a currency
union (CUjnit), or to a regional trade agreement (RTA
j
nit). We include an exporter
fixed effect exjit following Waugh (2010), who shows that the exporter fixed effect
specification does a better job at matching the patterns in both country incomes
and observed price levels. Finally, there is an error term νjnit. Section IV.D
assesses the robustness of the estimates to both the set of geographic controls
and the assumption of the exporter fixed effect in djnit. Note that all the variables
have a time subscript and a sector superscript j: all the trade cost proxy variables
affect true iceberg trade costs djnit differentially across both time periods and
sectors. There is a range of evidence that trade volumes at sector level vary in
their sensitivity to distance or common border (see, among many others Do and
Levchenko (2007); Berthelon and Freund (2008)).
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This leads to the following final estimating equation:
ln
(
Xjnit
Xjnnt
)
= ln
(
T jit(c
j
it)
−θ
)
− θexjit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporter Fixed Effect
− ln
(
T jnt
(
cjnt
)−θ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Importer Fixed Effect
(6)
−θdjk,t − θbjnit − θCUjnit − θRTAjnit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bilateral Observables
−θνjnit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Error Term
.
This specification is estimated for each sector and decade separately, allowing for
complete flexibility in how the coefficients vary both across sectors and over time.
Estimating this relationship will thus yield, for each country and time period, an
estimate of its technology-cum-unit-cost term in each sector j, T jnt(c
j
nt)
−θ, which
is obtained by exponentiating the importer fixed effect. The available degrees of
freedom imply that these estimates are of each country’s T jnt(c
j
nt)
−θ relative to a
reference country, which in our estimation is the United States. We denote this
estimated value by Sjnt:
Sjnt =
T jnt
T just
(
cjnt
cjust
)−θ
,
where the subscript us denotes the United States. It is immediate from this
expression that estimation delivers a convolution of technology parameters T jnt
and cost parameters cjnt. Both will of course affect trade volumes, but we would
like to extract technology T jnt from these estimates. In order to do that, we follow
the approach of Shikher (2012). In particular, for each country n, the share of
total spending going to home-produced goods is given by
Xjnnt
Xjnt
= T jnt
(
Γcjnt
pjnt
)−θ
.
Dividing by its U.S. counterpart yields:
Xjnnt/X
j
nt
Xjus,us,t/X
j
ust
=
T jnt
T just
(
cjnt
cjust
pjust
pjnt
)−θ
= Sjnt
(
pjust
pjnt
)−θ
,
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and thus the ratio of price levels in sector j relative to the U.S. becomes:
(7)
pjnt
pjust
=
(
Xjnnt/X
j
nt
Xjus,us,t/X
j
ust
1
Sjnt
) 1
θ
.
The entire right-hand side of this expression is either observable or estimated.
Thus, we can impute the price levels relative to the U.S. in each country and
each tradeable sector. The cost of the input bundles relative to the U.S. can be
written as:
cjnt
cjust
=
(
wnt
wust
)αjβj ( rnt
rust
)(1−αj)βj  J∏
j′=1
(
pj
′
nt
pj
′
ust
)γj′j1−βj (pJ+1nt
pJ+1ust
)γJ+1,j(1−βj)
.
Using information on relative wages, returns to capital, price in each tradeable
sector from (7), and the nontradeable sector price relative to the U.S., we can
thus impute the costs of the input bundles relative to the U.S. in each country
and each sector. Armed with those values, it is straightforward to back out the
relative technology parameters:
T jnt
T just
= Sjnt
(
cjnt
cjust
)θ
.
This approach bears a close affinity to development accounting (see, e.g. Caselli,
2005). Development accounting starts with an observable variable to be accounted
for (real per capita income), and employs other observables – physical capital, hu-
man capital, health endowments, etc. – to absorb as much cross-country variation
in the variable of interest as possible. The unexplained remainder is called TFP.
In our procedure, the outcome variable of interest is not income but Sjnt. In-
tuitively, if, controlling for the typical gravity determinants of trade, a country
spends relatively more on domestically produced goods in a particular sector – Sjnt
is high – it is revealed to have either a high relative productivity or a low relative
factor and input cost in that sector. Just as in development accounting, we then
use measured factor and intermediate input prices to net out the role of factor
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and input costs, yielding an estimate of relative productivity as a residual.7 As in
development accounting, to reach reliable estimates it is important to net out the
impact of as many observables as possible. Thus, our model features human and
physical capital and sophisticated input linkages, including explicit nontradeable
inputs. To accurately reflect sectoral factor and input cost differences, production
function parameters are sector-specific.
B. Complete Estimation
So far we have estimated the levels of technology of the tradeable sectors relative
to the United States. To complete our estimation, we still need to find (i) the
levels of T for the tradeable sectors in the United States; (ii) the taste parameters
ωj , and (iii) the nontradeable technology levels for all countries.
To obtain (i), we use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the
U.S. (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). We start by measuring the observed TFP
levels for the tradeable sectors in the U.S.. The form of the production function
gives
(8) lnZjust = ln Λ
j
ust+βjαj lnL
j
ust+βj(1−αj) lnKjust+ (1−βj)
J+1∑
j′=1
γj′j lnM
j′j
ust,
where Λj denotes the measured TFP in sector j, Zj denotes the output, Lj de-
notes the labor input, Kj denotes the capital input, and M j
′j denotes the inter-
mediate input from sector j′. The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database
offers information on output, and inputs of labor, capital, and intermediates,
along with deflators for each. Thus, we can estimate the observed TFP level for
each manufacturing tradeable sector using the above equation.
If the United States were a closed economy, the observed TFP level for sector
j would be given by Λjust = (T
j
ust)
1
θ . In the open economies, the goods with
inefficient domestic productivity draws will not be produced and will be imported
instead. Thus, international trade and competition introduce selection in the
observed TFP level, as demonstrated by Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013).
7Since our approach uses factor prices rather than factor endowments, it is closer in spirit to the
“dual” approach to growth accounting (e.g. Hsieh, 2002).
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We thus use the model to back out the true level of T just of each tradeable sector
in the United States. Here we follow Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013) and
use the following relationship:
(Λjust)
θ = T just +
∑
i 6=us
T jit
(
cjitd
j
usit
cjust
)−θ
.
Thus, we have
(Λjust)
θ = T just
1 + ∑
i 6=us
T jit
T just
(
cjitd
j
usit
cjust
)−θ
= T just
1 + ∑
i 6=us
Sjit
(
djusit
)−θ .
(9)
This equation can be solved for underlying technology parameters T just in the
U.S., given estimated observed TFP Λjust, and all the S
j
it’s and d
j
usit’s estimated
in the previous subsection.
To estimate the taste parameters {ωj}Jj=1, we use information on final con-
sumption shares in the tradeable sectors in the U.S.. We start with a guess of
{ωj}Jj=1 and find sectoral prices pj′nt as follows. For an initial guess of sectoral
prices, we compute the tradeable sector aggregate price and the nontradeable
sector price using the data on the relative prices of nontradeables to tradeables.
Using these prices, we calculate sectoral unit costs and Φjnt’s, and update prices
according to equation (4), iterating until the prices converge. We then update
the taste parameters according to equation (5), using the data on final sectoral
expenditure shares in the U.S.. We normalize the vector of ωj ’s to have a sum
of one, and repeat the above procedure until the values for the taste parameters
converge. This procedure is carried out on the 2000s, and the resulting values
applied to the entire period.
Finally, we calibrate the nontradeable sector TFP in each country to match the
observed PPP-adjusted income per capita. This step involves solving the model
with an initial guess of {T J+1nt }Nn=1 and iteratively updating it until the model-
implied income per capita adjusted for the aggregate price converges to that in
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the data for each country and each decade. This calibration approach guarantees
that the model produces a cross-country income distribution identical to the data
for each decade.
C. Data Description and Implementation
We assemble data on production and trade for a sample of up to 72 countries, 19
manufacturing sectors, and spanning 5 decades, from the 1960s to the 2000s. Pro-
duction data come from the 2009 UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, which
reports output, value added, employment, and wage bills at roughly 2-digit ISIC
Revision 3 level of disaggregation for the period 1962-2007 in the best of cases.
The corresponding trade data come from the COMTRADE database compiled
by the United Nations. The trade data are collected at the 4-digit SITC level,
and aggregated up to the 2-digit ISIC level using a concordance developed by
the authors. Production and trade data were extensively checked for quality, and
a number of countries were discarded due to poor data quality. In addition, in
less than 5% of country-year-sector observations, the reported total output was
below total exports, and thus had to be imputed based on earlier values and the
evolution of exports.
The distance and common border variables are obtained from the comprehen-
sive geography database compiled by CEPII. Information on regional trade agree-
ments comes from the RTA database maintained by the WTO. The currency union
indicator comes from Rose (2004), and was updated for the post-2000 period us-
ing publicly available information (such as the membership in the Euro area, and
the dollarization of Ecuador and El Salvador).
In addition to providing data on output for gravity estimation, the UNIDO data
are used to estimate production function parameters αj and βj . To compute αj
for each sector, we calculate the share of the total wage bill in value added, and
take a simple median across countries (taking the mean yields essentially the
same results). To compute βj , we take the median of value added divided by
total output.
The intermediate input coefficients γj′j are obtained from the Direct Require-
ments Table for the United States. We use the 1997 Benchmark Detailed Make
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and Use Tables (covering approximately 500 distinct sectors), as well as a concor-
dance to the ISIC Revision 3 classification to build a Direct Requirements Table
at the 2-digit ISIC level. The Direct Requirements Table gives the value of the
intermediate input in row j′ required to produce one dollar of final output in
column j. Thus, it is the direct counterpart of the input coefficients γj′j . In ad-
dition, we use the U.S. I-O matrix to obtain the shares of total final consumption
expenditure going to each sector, which we use to pin down taste parameters ωj
in traded sectors 1, ..., J ; as well as αJ+1 and βJ+1 in the nontradeable sector,
which cannot be obtained from UNIDO.8 The baseline analysis assumes αj , βj ,
and γj′j to be the same in all countries. Section IV.D assesses the robustness of
the productivity estimates to allowing these parameters to vary by country.
The total labor force in each country, Lnt, and the total capital stock, Knt,
are obtained from the Penn World Tables 8.0 (PWT8.0). The labor endowment
Lnt is corrected for human capital (schooling) differences using the human capital
variable available in PWT8.0. Thus, the wage wnt captures the relative price of
an efficiency unit of labor. The capital series Knt is available directly in PWT8.0.
The saving/investment rate snt is calculated based on the Penn World Tables as
the implied decadal snt that matches the evolution of capital from t to t + 1,
given real income and the country-time specific depreciation rate. This approach,
together with the fact that our calibration procedure matched perfectly the rela-
tive real per capita incomes for each country, ensures that the model matches the
observed capital stock from period to period.
The computation of relative costs of the input bundle requires information on
wages and the returns to capital. To compute wnt, we take the gross non-PPP
adjusted labor income in PWT8.0, and divide it by the effective endowment of
labor, namely the product of the total employment and the per capita human
capital. This yields the payment to one efficiency unit of labor in each country
and decade.
Obtaining information on the return to capital, rnt, is less straightforward,
8The U.S. I-O matrix provides an alternative way of computing αj and βj . These parameters calcu-
lated based on the U.S. I-O table are very similar to those obtained from UNIDO, with the correlation
coefficients between them above 0.85 in each case. The U.S. I-O table implies greater variability in αj ’s
and βj ’s across sectors than does UNIDO.
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since it is not observable directly. In the baseline analysis, we impute rnt from the
information on the total income, endowment of capital, and the labor share: rnt =
(1 − αnt)Ynt/Knt, where the labor share αnt, total income Ynt, and total capital
Knt come directly from the PWT8.0. Since the return to capital is notoriously
difficult to measure, Section IV.D evaluates the robustness of the estimates to
four alternative ways of inferring rnt.
The price of nontradeables relative to the U.S., pJ+1nt /p
J+1
ust , are computed us-
ing the detailed price data collected by the International Comparison of Prices
Program (ICP). For a few countries and decades, these relative prices are extrap-
olated using a simple linear fit to log PPP-adjusted per capita GDP from the
Penn World Tables.
In order to estimate the relative TFP’s in the tradeable sectors in the U.S.,
we use the 2009 version of the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database,
which reports the total output, total input usage, employment, and capital stock,
along with deflators for each of these in each sector. The data are available in the
6-digit NAICS classification for the period 1958 to 2005, and are converted into
ISIC 2-digit sectors using a concordance developed by the authors. The procedure
yields sectoral measured TFP’s for the U.S. in each tradeable sector j = 1, ..., J
and each decade.
The share of expenditure on traded goods, ξnt in each country and decade
is sourced from Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013), who compile this information for 30
developed and developing countries. For countries unavailable in the Uy, Yi and
Zhang data, values of ξnt are imputed based on fitting a simple linear relationship
to log PPP-adjusted per capita GDP from the Penn World Tables. In each decade,
the fit of this simple bivariate regression is typically quite good, with R2’s of 0.30
to 0.80 across decades.
The baseline analysis assumes that the dispersion parameter θ does not vary
across sectors and sets θ = 8.28, which is the preferred estimate of EK. Section
IV.D shows that the productivity estimates are quite similar under two alternative
sets of assumptions on θ: (i) a lower value of θ = 4, and (ii) sector-specific values
of θj .
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We choose the elasticity of substitution between broad sectors within the trade-
able bundle, η, to be equal to 2. Since these are very large product categories, it
is sensible that this elasticity would be relatively low. It is higher, however, than
the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and nontradeable goods, which is
set to 1 by the Cobb-Douglas assumption. The elasticity of substitution between
varieties within each tradeable sector, ε, is set to 4 (as is well known, in the EK
model this elasticity plays no role, entering only the constant Γ).
Appendix Table A1 lists the countries used in the analysis along with the time
periods for which data are available for each country, and Appendix Table A2 lists
the sectors along with the key parameter values for each sector: αj , βj , the share
of nontradeable inputs in total inputs γJ+1,j , and the taste parameter ωj . All of
the variables that vary over time are averaged for each decade, from the 1960s
to the 2000s, and these decennial averages are used in the analysis throughout.
Thus, our unit of time is a decade.
IV. Evolution of Comparative Advantage
This section describes the basic patterns in how estimated sector-level technol-
ogy varies across countries and over time, focusing especially on whether compara-
tive advantage has become stronger or weaker. Going through the steps described
in Section III.A yields, for each country n, tradeable sector j, and decade t, the
state of technology relative to the U.S., T jnt/T
j
ust. Since mean productivity in each
sector is equal to (T jnt)
1/θ, we carry out the analysis on this exponentiated value,
rather than T jnt.
A. Basic Patterns
Table B1 presents summary statistics for the OECD and non-OECD countries
in each decade. The first column reports the mean productivity relative to the
U.S. across all sectors in a country, a measure that can be thought of as absolute
advantage. The OECD countries as a group catch up to the U.S. between the
1960s and the 2000s, with productivities going up from 0.91 to in excess of 1
over the period. The non-OECD countries’ productivity is lower throughout,
but the catch-up is also evident. The second column in each panel summarizes
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the magnitude of within-country differences in productivity across sectors, i.e.,
the coefficient of variation of sectoral productivities within a country, averaged
by country group and decade. This measure can be thought of as comparative
advantage across sectors. The average coefficient of variation is about 50% lower
in the OECD countries compared to the non-OECD, reflecting higher dispersion of
sectoral productivities in poorer countries, or “stronger comparative advantage.”
In both country groups, there is a clear downward trend in the coefficient of
variation, which is first evidence that comparative advantage is getting weaker
over time – sectoral relative productivity dispersion within a country is falling.
The bottom panel presents the same statistics but balancing the country sample
across decades. There are virtually no changes for the OECD, since the OECD
sample is more or less balanced to begin with. For the non-OECD, balancing the
sample implies dropping 19 countries in later decades, but the basic patterns are
unchanged.
The evolution of these averages over time masks a great deal of heterogeneity
among countries. To visualize this heterogeneity, Figures B1(a) and B1(b) plot
the changes in the average T 1/θ against their initial average values. The left
panel does this from the 1960s to the 2000s, the right panel from the 1990s.
These plots can be thought of as capturing the traditional (cross-country) notion
of absolute convergence. There is quite a bit of dispersion in the extent to which
countries caught up on average to U.S. productivity, including a few countries
that fell behind on average relative to the U.S.. There is an apparent negative
relationship between the extent of catch-up and the initial average level, stronger
from the 1990s.
Figures B1(c) and B1(d) plot the within-country dispersions of productivities
(the coefficients of variation) in the 2000s against their values in the 1960s and
the 1990s, respectively. For convenience, 45-degree lines are added to these plots.
There is a fair amount of cross-country variation in productivity dispersion, and
this variation appears to be persistent over time. Since the 1960s, sectoral pro-
ductivity dispersion fell in the majority of countries (in all but 13). Between the
1990s and the 2000s, there is no systematic fall in dispersion: Table B1 shows that
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the coefficient of variation actually rises on average between those two decades in
both groups of countries.
B. Relative Convergence
To shed further light on whether comparative advantage has gotten stronger or
weaker over time, we estimate a convergence specification in the spirit of Barro
(1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992):
(10) ∆ log
(
T jn
)1/θ
= βInitial log
(
T jn
)1/θ
+ δn + δj + nj .
Unlike the classic cross-country convergence regression, our specification pools
countries and sectors. On the left-hand side is the log change in the productivity
of sector j in country n. The right-hand side regressor of interest is its beginning-
of-period value. All of the specifications include country and sector fixed effects,
which affects the interpretation of the coefficient. The country effect absorbs the
average change in productivity across all sectors in each country – the absolute
advantage. Thus, β picks up the impact of the initial relative productivity on
the relative growth of a sector within a country – the evolution of comparative
advantage. In particular, a negative value of β implies that relative to the country-
specific average, the most backward sectors grew fastest.
Table B2 presents the results. The first column reports the coefficients for the
longest differences: the 1960s to the 2000s, while the second column estimates
the specification starting in the 1980s. The following 4 columns carry out the
estimation decade-by-decade, 1960s to 1970s, 1970s to 1980s, and so on. Since the
length of the time period differs across columns, the coefficients are not directly
comparable. To help interpret the coefficients, underneath each one we report
the speed of convergence, calculated according to the standard Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992) formula: β = e−λT − 1, where β is the regression coefficient on
the initial value of productivity, T is the number of decades between the initial
and final period, and λ is the convergence speed. This number gives how much of
the initial difference between productivities is expected to disappear in a decade.
All of the standard errors are clustered by country, to account for unspecified
heteroscedasticity at the country level. All of the results are robust to clustering
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instead at the sector level, and we do not report those standard errors to conserve
space.9
Column 1 of the top panel reports the estimates for the long-run convergence in
the pooled sample of all countries. The coefficient is negative, implying that there
is convergence: within a country, the weakest sectors tend to grow faster. It is
highly statistically significant: even with clustered standard errors the t-statistic is
nearly 12. The speed of convergence implied by this coefficient is 18% per decade.
As a benchmark, the classic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) rate of convergence is
2% per year, or 22% per decade, close to what we find in a very different setting.
The second column estimates the long-difference specification from the 1980s to
the 2000s. Once again, the coefficient is negative and highly significant, but it
implies a considerably slower rate of convergence, 11.7% per decade. The rest
of the columns report the results decade-by-decade. Though there is statistically
significant convergence in each decade, the speed of convergence trends downward,
from 26% from the 1960 to the 1970s, to 11.4% in the most recent period.
In order to assess how the results differ across country groups, Panels B and
C report the results for the OECD and the non-OECD subsamples separately.
Breaking it down produces slightly faster convergence rates than in the full sam-
ple. In the decade-to-decade specifications, the non-OECD countries are catching
up somewhat faster, which is not surprising.
Figures B2 and B3 present the results graphically. Figure B2 plots the un-
conditional bivariate relationship between the log change in productivity and the
log initial level in each sector. Within most sectors, the negative relationship is
9If the initial T ’s tend to be measured with error, it has been noted that the convergence regression
of the type estimated here will produce bias in favor of finding convergence (Quah, 1993). We ran a
number of checks to assess the relevance of this effect in our setting. First, we estimated a number
of panel specifications with a variety of interacted fixed effects: country×sector, country×decade, and
sector×decade included together in estimation. These additional fixed effects will help control for mea-
surement error that varies mainly at country-sector, country-time, or sector-time level, respectively. We
also implemented the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond dynamic panel estimators, that difference the
data and use lagged values of T to instrument for current changes in T . All of these alternative esti-
mates actually imply a faster speed of convergence than the estimates in Table B2. Second, to check
how much measurement error is needed to generate our results, we ran a simulation in which we started
with artificial data exhibiting zero convergence across sectors within a country, and added measurement
error to the right-hand side variable until the OLS coefficient was equal to the coefficient found in our
estimates. It turns out that in order for measurement error to produce coefficient magnitudes found in
the data when the truth is zero convergence, it must be the case that 62% of the cross-sectoral variation
in the right-hand side variable is due to measurement error.
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evident. In every sector, the estimated coefficient is negative, and in 14 of the 19
sectors, it is significant at the 5% level. Figure B3 plots the partial correlation
between the initial level and subsequent growth, after netting out country and
sector fixed effects. This is the partial correlation plot underlying the first coef-
ficient reported in Table B2. Once again, the negative relationship is evident in
the pooled sample.
Appendix Tables A3 reports the results of estimating the convergence equation
(10) country by country from the 1960s to today. These results should be treated
with more caution, as the sample size is at most 19. The columns report the
coefficient, the standard error, the number of observations, the R2, as well as the
implied speed of convergence for each country. There is considerable evidence of
convergence in these country-specific estimates. In all countries, the convergence
coefficient is negative, and significant at the 10% level or below in 38 out of 50
available countries (76%).
All in all, these results provide robust evidence of relative convergence: in all
time periods and broad sets of countries we consider, relatively weak sectors grow
faster, with sensible rates of convergence. This implies that Ricardian compar-
ative advantage is getting weaker, at least when measured at the level of broad
manufacturing sectors.
C. Discussion
A large literature in growth, synthesized by Acemoglu (2008, Ch. 18), stud-
ies aggregate country-level technology differences using multi-country models of
technology adoption. This literature has pursued two broad directions. The
first postulates that aggregate productivity differences persist because there are
frictions in technology adoption. In order to ensure a stable world income distri-
bution, a central assumption in this type of framework is that countries farther
behind the world productivity frontier find it easier to increase productivity. This
hypothesis dates back to Gerschenkron (1962), and is typically introduced as a
reduced-form relationship in these models. The second approach postulates that
all technologies are freely available to all countries at all times, but due to capital
and/or skill endowment or institutional differences, poorer countries cannot make
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the best use of the available technologies (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; Basu and
Weil, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Acemoglu,
Antra´s and Helpman, 2007).
Since these models are framed in terms of aggregate technology differences,
they are challenging to evaluate empirically. This is because at the country level,
it is difficult to distinguish between the role of distance to the world frontier and
other country-specific factors, especially when these factors themselves condition
the speed of productivity convergence. By opening up a sectoral dimension, our
results can provide some empirical evidence on these theories. Our convergence
regressions include country fixed effects, and thus control for country-specific
determinants of productivity growth affecting all the sectors equally. Though our
convergence coefficients capture the notion of within-country convergence, they
nonetheless lend support to the key assumption in models of slow technology
diffusion: it is easier to catch up starting from a more backward position.
The second approach rationalizes persistent technology gaps by appealing to the
appropriateness of world frontier technologies for local country conditions, such
as the capital-labor ratio (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; Basu and Weil, 1998), skill
endowment (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Caselli and Coleman, 2006), or insti-
tutional quality (Acemoglu, Antra´s and Helpman, 2007). While our results are
not geared to informing or testing these theories, we can use the variation in the
country-specific convergence coefficients in Appendix Table A3 to look for some
supporting evidence. Once again, the mapping to existing theories is inexact:
our results capture within-country, cross-sectoral speed of convergence, whereas
the theoretical literature is about cross-country differences. In addition, variation
across sectors in some relevant attributes, such as capital or skill intensity, may
play a role as well. Nonetheless, there are some modest but suggestive patterns.
The country-specific speed of convergence reported in Appendix Table A3 is pos-
itively correlated with the country’s capital-labor ratio (correlation 0.54), skill
endowment (correlation 0.29), and institutional quality (correlation 0.47).10 Of
10These correlations are computed after dropping the 3 outlier countries with the highest speed of
convergence point estimates. Without dropping outliers, the correlations are 0.40, 0.31, and 0.42, re-
spectively. The institutional quality index is “Rule of Law” sourced from the World Bank’s Governance
Matters Database.
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course, these three country characteristics are highly positively correlated, and
thus distinguishing between the alternative theories using our data is impractical.
However, the positive correlations are suggestive that country characteristics do
matter for the speed of technology adoption in ways predicted by theory.
In contrast to the aggregate productivity literature, theories of the dynamics of
sectoral technology and Ricardian comparative advantage are quite scarce. Krug-
man (1987) and Young (1991) develop learning-by-doing models of comparative
advantage. A strong implication of these models is that relative productivity
differences increase over time – comparative advantage strengthens. This is be-
cause learning is faster in sectors that produce more, and comparative advantage
sectors are the ones that produce more. Our results are clearly inconsistent with
the main prediction of the learning-by-doing models, at least not at the level of
broad sectors. Similarly, Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 18) develop a model
with a traditional and a knowledge-based sector, and show that one country’s ini-
tial advantage in the stock of R&D leads to an increasingly stronger comparative
advantage in the knowledge-based sector. Once again, our findings of pervasive
convergence in productivity do not support this type of theoretical prediction.
A theoretical and quantitative framework with endogenous sectoral productiv-
ity that can be used for understanding the empirical patterns we identify is yet
to be developed, and remains a potentially fruitful direction for future research.
One promising possibility is the framework of “defensive innovation” in response
to import competition recently developed by Bloom et al. (2012) (see also Bloom,
Draca and Van Reenen, 2011).
D. Robustness of T Estimates
This section presents a battery of robustness checks on our productivity estima-
tion procedure. The outcomes are summarized in Appendix Table A4. The table
reports the mean productivity T 1/θ relative to the U.S., its standard deviation
across countries and sectors, the correlation with the baseline productivity esti-
mates across countries and sectors, and the convergence coefficient and standard
error from the main regression specification (10), estimated on the alternative sets
of productivity estimates. To ease comparison, the top row reports the values for
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the baseline T 1/θ estimates.
The first set of checks concerns the specification of the gravity equation (6).
To assess whether the estimates are sensitive to the set of distance and gravity
variables included in estimation, we repeat the analysis while doubling the set of
distance intervals (from 6 to 12), and including standard additional controls for
common language and colonial ties, which are absent from the baseline specifica-
tion. As the row labeled “Additional gravity” reveals, the resulting productivity
estimates and convergence results are virtually indistinguishable from the base-
line.
Next, we estimate the gravity equation in levels using the Poisson Pseudo Max-
imum Likelihood approach suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This
has the convenient property of not dropping zero trade observations from the
estimation sample. The results are once again very similar to the baseline across
the board.11
The next robustness check concerns whether the trade cost specification in-
cludes an exporter or an importer effect. Waugh (2010) appeals to tradeable
prices to argue that the specification with an exporter fixed effect fits the data
better. In particular, he documents that in the data, tradeable prices are weakly
increasing in income. The model with the exporter fixed effect in djnit can match
this pattern. However, the model with the importer fixed cost in djnit delivers
the sharply counterfactual prediction that tradeable prices fall in income. In ad-
dition, Waugh (2010) shows that the importer fixed effect specification does less
11A standard feature of the baseline procedure is that the trade shares are logged, so that the zero
bilateral import flows are dropped from the estimation sample. Unfortunately, our large-scale model
cannot be tractably enriched to explicitly account for zeros in trade while at the same time retaining
the structural interpretation linking the fixed effects to underlying productivity. However, we can check
the ex-post performance of the estimated model with respect to zeros by solving the full model, and
computing within the model the sum of the pijnit’s in the importer-exporter-sector observations that are
zeros in the actual data. We can then examine whether these observations account for large shares of
absorption inside the model. If the resulting numbers are large, then the quantitative model predicts
substantial trade flows where in reality they are zero. However, if these numbers are small, the model
predicts very small flows where the actual flows are zero, providing a good approximation to the data
even though baseline productivities are estimated dropping zero trade. The results of this exercise are
reported in Appendix Table A5. The exercise takes the most expansive view of the zeros, by assuming
that all trade flows missing in the data are actually zeros as well. Observations for which the data exhibit
zero/missing trade flows account for a tiny share of overall absorption in our quantitative model: in each
decade, these observations add up to on average less than 0.9% of the total absorption. Breaking down
across sectors and decades, we see that nearly all individual sectors or decades, these shares are small.
We conclude from this exercise that in spite of ignoring the zero trade observations in estimation, our
quantitative model is quite close to the data when it comes to small/zero trade flows.
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well in other dimensions, such as matching observed income differences between
countries.
Though we employ a very different model than Waugh (2010) – most impor-
tantly, we have multiple tradeable sectors, an explicit non-tradeable sector, and
input linkages between those – his argument applies in our setting as well, albeit
in a milder form. Just as in Waugh (2010), our baseline model with exporter
effects in djnit delivers a flat tradeable prices-income relationship, matching the
data. By contrast, when we re-estimate the model with importer effects in djnit,
it implies a negative relationship between tradeable prices and income.
Nonetheless, we present the results of re-estimating sectoral productivities based
on the importer effects in djnit assumption. The results, presented in row “im
j
nt in
djnit” reveal that the average productivities implied by this alternative approach
are lower (0.53 at the mean compared to 0.74 for the baseline). However, the dis-
persion in those productivities is very similar to the baseline, and the two sets of
estimates have a correlation of 0.89. Most importantly, the relative convergence
result is clearly evident in these estimates, though the speed of convergence is
somewhat slower than in the baseline.
The second set of robustness checks concerns the measurement of the return
to capital rnt, that enters the unit cost terms c
j
nt, and thus the productivity
estimates. The baseline computes rnt using data on Knt, the total income Ynt,
and the (country- and time-specific) labor share. However, the return to capital
is notoriously difficult to measure, and thus we perform a battery of robustness
checks on rnt. First, we use the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) correction for natural
wealth. The data for natural wealth are for 1995-2005, and come from the World
Bank. Even for this later period, not all countries in our baseline sample are
covered. In addition, these data are not available before 1995, which forces us to
apply the 1995 values to all preceding decades.
Second, we use a measure of the return to capital computed instead from con-
sumption growth. Namely, we exploit the Euler equation in consumption to back
out the rate of return on capital: 1 + rnt+1 − δnt = U
′(Cnt+1)
ρU ′(Cnt) , with ρ the discount
factor. We use Penn World Tables data on consumption and the country-specific
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depreciation rate δnt, and the standard functional form/parameter assumptions,
namely CRRA utility U(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ , with σ = 2 and annual ρ = 0.96. The results
are reported in row labeled “Euler.”
Third, we use data on lending interest rates from the World Development Indi-
cators. This approach yields a 20% smaller sample of countries and decades. The
results are in the row labeled “Direct.” And finally, we adopt the simple assump-
tion that rnt is the same everywhere in the world at a point in time (rnt = rust
∀n, t). This assumption can correspond to financial integration, for instance.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that at least as of the 1990s, this is not a bad
assumption. The results are in the row “Fin. Integration.”
The means and standard deviations of estimated productivities under these four
alternative approaches do not differ much from the baseline. The correlations to
the baseline are also quite high, from 0.91 under the direct measurement to 0.99
under the Caselli-Feyrer correction. The convergence results are also equally
strong under these alternative approaches of measuring rnt.
Next, we check the sensitivity of the results to the assumption that the pro-
duction functions (IO matrices and factor shares) are the same across countries.
The row “Country-Specific IO” presents the results of estimating productivities
using country-specific IO matrices sourced from GTAP. GTAP’s coverage of sec-
tors and countries is not the same as in our analysis, requiring some imputation,
and thus we do not use these in the baseline analysis. The row “Country-Specific
IO, α, β” in addition assumes that the labor share in value added (α) and the
share of value added in output (β) are vary by country and decade (and of course,
as always, by sector). We compute these directly for each sector, country, and
decade using UNIDO data on the wage bill, value added, and output. We do not
use these values in the baseline analysis, because the UNIDO data do not have
complete coverage, requiring some imputation. In addition, it can be noisy, and
thus variation in these empirical factor shares across countries and over time may
not provide a reliable indication of true differences in factor intensity. These two
alternative approaches yield slightly higher average productivities, but the varia-
tion is similar to the baseline and the correlations are very high. The convergence
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results are also equally strong.
The final set of checks is on the θ parameters. First, one may be concerned
about how the results change under lower values of θ. Lower θ implies greater
within-sector heterogeneity in the random productivity draws. Thus, trade flows
become less sensitive to the costs of the input bundles (cjnt), and the gains from
intra-sectoral trade become larger relative to the gains from inter-sectoral trade.
We repeated the estimation assuming instead a value of θ = 4, which has been
advocated by Simonovska and Waugh (2014) and is at or near the bottom of the
range that has been used in the literature. Overall, the results are remarkably
similar. The mean productivities are virtually the same, and there is actually
somewhat greater variability in T jnt’s under θ = 4. The correlation between
estimated T jnt’s under θ = 4 and the baseline is above 0.94. The convergence
results are equally strong.
Second, a number of studies have suggested that θ varies across sectors (see,
e.g., Chen and Novy, 2011; Caliendo and Parro, 2014; Imbs and Me´jean, 2014).
We repeat the estimation allowing θj to be sector-specific, with sectoral values
of θj sourced from Caliendo and Parro (2014). The average productivities are
once again quite similar, and have an 0.87 correlation with the baseline. The
convergence results are if anything stronger than in the baseline.
Another important question is whether our estimates can be cross-validated us-
ing direct estimates of measured TFP. Appendix A estimates measured TFP using
data on real output and inputs from the OECD Structural Analysis database. It
is the most comprehensive database that contains the information required to es-
timate measured TFP on a consistent basis across countries and over time. Using
both simple correlations and regression estimates with fixed effects, we confirm
that our baseline estimates indeed exhibit a close positive association with TFP
calculated based on STAN data.
E. Simple Heuristics: What is Driving the Convergence Finding?
What kinds of basic patterns in the data are driving these results? Though our
estimation procedure is based on a theoretically-founded gravity equation and a
variety of data sources, and thus is fully internally consistent with the underly-
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ing conceptual framework, it would be reassuring if we could show some simple
heuristic relationships in the data that are consistent with weakening compar-
ative advantage. We can build intuition as follows: in a simpler model with 2
tradeable and 1 nontradeable sectors, Uy, Yi and Zhang (2013) show analytically
that all else equal, a comparative advantage sector has a smaller share of imports
in total domestic absorption 1− pijnn than a comparative disadvantage sector. As
a country’s comparative advantage in sector j weakens, the import share rises in
that sector. This is intuitive: when a country becomes relatively less productive
in a sector, it starts importing more.
Thus, weakening comparative advantage should manifest itself in a negative
relationship between the initial period import share and the subsequent change
in the import share. Sectors within a country with the lowest initial import
share (1− pijnn) should see that import share rise. These are the sectors with the
strongest comparative advantage at the beginning of the period. Correspondingly,
sectors with the highest initial import share should see their import share drop
as they catch up in productivity faster.
Figure B4(a) presents this scatterplot, pooling sectors and countries. The neg-
ative relationship is remarkably pronounced: the slope coefficient in the simple
bivariate regression is −0.397 with a t-statistic of 16.5 and an R2 of 18.4%. Note
that a significant share of the observations – those below zero on the y-axis – have
seen their import share actually fall between the 1960s and today. These declines
in import shares would be highly puzzling over the period during which trade
costs fell and global trade volumes rose dramatically. A strengthening of compar-
ative advantage in those sectors provides a plausible explanation: countries are
getting relatively better in those industries, and thus they need to import less.
This negative relationship would not necessarily be evidence of relative con-
vergence in the T ’s if, for instance, trade costs djnit fell disproportionately more
in sectors in which countries had higher initial import shares. To check for this
possibility, Figure B4(b) plots the change in the average trade costs in sector j
and country n against the initial import share – the same x-axis variable as in the
previous figure. There is virtually no relationship between initial import share
33
and subsequent changes in import costs: the slope coefficient is essentially zero,
and the R2 is correspondingly 0.00. Thus, it does not appear that systemati-
cally larger reductions in djnit in the initial comparative disadvantage sectors were
primarily responsible for the pattern in Figure B4(a). Note that our estimation
procedure is designed precisely to take into account any changes in djnit (as well
as unit factor costs) by importer-exporter pair and sector that may have occurred
over this period, isolating the underlying productivity changes.
V. Quantitative Implications
This section computes the global impact of changes in comparative advantage
documented in the previous section. In order to do this, we solve the full model
laid out in Section II for a variety of values of technology parameters. The main
goal of the exercise is to compare outcomes in the world as we see it today to a
counterfactual world in which average productivities remain as they are in the
data, but relative sectoral productivities are fixed to their initial values. The
outcomes we are interested in are trade volumes and patterns, and welfare/real
incomes.
Our framework features endogenous capital accumulation. Thus, to model the
counterfactual world in which comparative advantage is fixed, we must track what
happens to capital in each decade in this case. Our results thus also reflect the
impact of changing comparative advantage on capital accumulation over the past
5 decades.
A. Benchmark Results and Model Fit
The baseline corresponds to the actual values of T jnt estimated for the past five
decades. Before running the counterfactual experiments, we assess the fit of the
baseline model in a number of dimensions. By construction, the model matches
perfectly the real PPP-adjusted per capita income in each country. Table B3
compares w’s and r’s in the model and in the data for 2000s. (The results for the
previous decades are similar.) The baseline model performs well: the means and
the medians match up fairly well, and the correlation between model and data
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wages is 0.95. The correlation in r’s is somewhat lower at 0.59.
The next panel assesses the model’s ability to match the sectoral trade flows. It
reports the means and medians, across countries and sectors, of pijnnt. The model
reproduces the overall magnitudes well, and the correlation between the model
and the data is 0.92. The same can be said for the cross-border flows pijnit, i 6= n,
reported in the bottom panel.
B. Counterfactual Comparative Advantage
In the counterfactual experiments, we solve the model while keeping compara-
tive advantage fixed to the 1960s. Thus, the counterfactual exercise assumes that
for each decade t after the 1960s, each country’s sectoral productivities relative
to the world frontier grew at their geometric average rate, but comparative ad-
vantage remained the same as it was in the 1960s. Precisely, the counterfactual
T˜ ’s are calculated as:
T˜ jnt
T jF t
=
T jn1960s
T jF1960s
×
(∏J
k=1
Tknt
TkFt
) 1
J
(∏J
k=1
Tkn1960s
TkF1960s
) 1
J
,
where T jF t is the world frontier in sector j at decade t. In each sector and decade,
we select the 2 highest values of T jnt/T
j
ust, take their geometric mean, and label
that the global frontier. We then compute each country’s technology parameters
in the counterfactual with reference to this frontier productivity.
The use of geometric averages has two appealing features. The first is that even
though the counterfactual T ’s are calculated to keep their distance to the frontier,
the geometric average of counterfactual T ’s is equal to the geometric average of
the country’s actual T ’s at every t. This ensures that the normalization to the
frontier does not induce movements up or down of the average productivity in the
country, which would confound the meaning of our counterfactual exercise. The
second appealing feature is that this formulation produces identical counterfactual
T ’s whether the experiment is carried out on absolute T ’s or T 1/θ’s, which are
the mean productivities. We keep productivity in the nontradeable sector at
the benchmark value in all the counterfactual experiments, since our focus is on
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the welfare impact of changes in comparative advantage. Thus, an additional
feature of the counterfactual design is that the productivity of tradeables relative
to nontradeables is also fixed throughout.
We perform two variants of this counterfactual experiment. The first, labeled
“global,” keeps relative productivities at their 1960s values for all countries in
the world simultaneously. This counterfactual is best suited for evaluating the
worldwide consequences of the observed global productivity convergence. The
second, “single-country,” keeps relative productivities at their initial values for
one country at a time, while the rest of the world has their baseline estimated
productivities. This counterfactual is ideal for evaluating the consequences for
each country of changes in its own comparative advantage.
Countries that join the sample later than the 1960s in the counterfactuals keep
their relative productivities fixed to the first decade they are in the data. We think
of those initial productivities as our best guess for their pattern of comparative
advantage as of the 1960s.
C. Trade Volumes and Trade Patterns
We begin with the discussion of the impact of changing comparative advantage
on observable outcomes, namely international trade volumes and patterns. Table
B4 presents the results. The first column reports the value of each moment in the
data, the second in the benchmark model, and the third and fourth in the global
and single-country counterfactuals, respectively. The numbers in italics under the
averages are the correlations across countries in each moment between the model
and the data.
The first row assesses the impact of changes in comparative advantage on trade
volumes. It reports the average manufacturing imports/GDP ratio in the 2000s
across the countries in the sample. The mean in the benchmark model matches
that in the data almost perfectly, and the correlation between the two is also high
at nearly 0.6. The next two columns report the manufacturing import/GDP ratio
for the two counterfactuals. It is clear that in the absence of changes in relative
productivities, world trade volumes would be even higher than they are today.
The difference is sizable: imports to GDP would be 3.7 percentage points higher
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if all countries kept their initial relative productivities, a 15% difference.
Next, we look at trade patterns rather than trade volumes, and examine whether
the model can match the long-run changes observed in the data. One sharp pat-
tern in the data is that within a sector, export volumes are becoming more similar
across countries over time. This is captured in the table by the change in the
standard deviation of log shares of world exports within a particular sector across
countries. The first column shows that in the data it has decreased systematically
between the 1960s and today. While the table reports the cross-sectoral average,
this pattern is also pervasive: in 17 out of 19 sectors, the dispersion of log country
shares of world exports has fallen. The next column reports the same statistic
in the benchmark model, as well as the correlation across sectors between the
model and the data. The model matches quite well both the overall decrease, and
the cross-sectoral pattern in changes in dispersion. This is not surprising, since
the benchmark model parameters are estimated on observed trade flows in each
decade, but nonetheless reassuring.
The next column reports the same statistic in the global counterfactual. It
is clear that productivity changes are largely responsible for this pattern: when
comparative advantage is held fixed, the cross-country dispersion in world export
shares is predicted to fall by nearly two-thirds less than in the baseline.12
Since world export shares are affected by many other factors, namely trade
costs, they do not have a clear model interpretation. It could be, for instance,
that world export shares are becoming more similar purely due to changes in
trade costs. Thus, we next examine the dispersion in the estimated unit cost
terms Sjnt. Since (S
j
nt)
1/θ = (T jnt)
1/θcjnt, it represents the average unit cost of
producing a sector j variety in country n, time t. Data (Sjnt)
1/θ are estimated
in Section III.A. It is clear that in the data, there has also been a fall in the
cross-country dispersion of (Sjnt)
1/θ within a sector. While the table reports the
sectoral average, the pattern is also pervasive, with 17 out of 19 sectors exhibiting
falls in dispersion. The next column reports the benchmark model outcome,
12As this exercise concerns the global dispersion in sectoral export shares, it is not well-defined in the
single-country counterfactual. the same applies to the next exercise, and thus in both cases those entries
in the table are left blank.
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which matches the data quite well. On the other hand, in the counterfactual,
the dispersion in (Sjnt)
1/θ would have decreased somewhat less on average. In
addition, while the benchmark matches the cross-sectoral pattern in the changes
in the standard deviation of Sjnt very well, the counterfactual does much less so.
Finally, we examine the patterns of intra-industry trade. To that end, we con-
struct the change in the Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index for each country and sector, and
report the simple average change in the GL index across countries and sectors.13
There has been a considerable increase in the extent of intra-industry trade over
time, with an average increase in the data of 0.16 (the GL index has a range of
0 to 1). The baseline model matches roughly two-thirds of this magnitude. By
contrast, the counterfactuals reveal no increase in the GL index had compara-
tive advantage not changed. Indeed, the single-country counterfactual actually
predicts a decrease in intra-industry trade across countries and sectors.
To summarize, observed changes in relative sectoral productivities had an ap-
preciable impact on world trade. Had comparative advantage not changed as it
did in the data, trade volumes would be even higher than they are today. In
addition, the weakening of comparative advantage accounts well for the increased
similarity in export flows between 1960s and today, and for the observed increase
in intra-industry trade.
D. Welfare
Finally, we evaluate the welfare impact of this phenomenon. Our measure of
welfare is real per capita income:
(11)
wnt + rntknt
Pnt
,
where knt = Knt/Lnt is capital per worker. We compare this measure of welfare in
the baseline for the 2000s to welfare for the same decade in the counterfactuals.
Our model solution assumes that the world is in steady state from the 2000s
onwards, and thus analyzing the present discounted value of utility in the 2000s
is equivalent to focusing on the period utility in the 2000s.
13The results are unchanged if instead we used trade-weighed averages, or first computed averages by
country, or by sector.
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Table B5 summarizes the results, separating the OECD and the non-OECD
countries. The table reports the percentage changes in welfare for the counter-
factual relative to the benchmark. Thus, the positive median values in the first
column indicate that on average, welfare would have been higher had comparative
advantage not changed since the 1960s. This accords well with what is predicted
by theory, given the pronounced weakening of comparative advantage we found in
the data in Section IV. However, now we can quantify these effects: for the me-
dian OECD country, welfare would have been 1.26% higher had its comparative
advantage not weakened. For the non-OECD, the impact would be somewhat
larger, 1.80% at the median.14
The second notable aspect of the results is the large dispersion. Among the
OECD countries, the standard deviation of welfare changes is 1.34%, while for the
non-OECD, it is 3 times higher, 6.62%. Correspondingly, the range of changes
is from −1.14% to 4.27% in the OECD, and from −4.60% to 41.93% in the
non-OECD. Importantly, among the non-OECD countries, welfare changes range
from substantially negative to substantially positive, indicating that heterogeneity
across countries is first-order.
The second panel of Table B5 presents the results from the single-country coun-
terfactual. Here, the impact is larger compared to the global counterfactual, at
2.16% for the OECD and 2.86% for the non-OECD at the median. The dispersion
is slightly higher, and it is more likely that a country is strictly better off keeping
its original comparative advantage in the single-country compared to the global
counterfactual. The welfare impacts of the two counterfactuals are very similar,
with a correlation of 97%.
To cross-check these results and compare magnitudes, the bottom panel of
Table B5 reports the same summary statistics for the overall gains from trade
compared to autarky for the 2000s in the baseline model. The welfare impact
of the evolution of comparative advantage is on average of the same order of
magnitude as the total gains from trade. The median gains from trade are 5.64%
14A related but distinct question is what is the population-weighted average welfare change, since
averaging with population weights in effect assigns equal weights to individuals, rather than countries.
It turns out that the population-weighted welfare change in the counterfactual relative to benchmark is
about 0.72% for the OECD and 2.24% for the non-OECD.
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for the median OECD country, and 7.22% for the median non-OECD country.
We can also compare the extent of variation in the welfare impact of technological
changes to that in the welfare gains from trade. In the OECD, the gains from
trade have a standard deviation of about 3.27% and a range of about 12%: from
a minimum of 1.5 to a maximum of 13.09%. Thus, for the OECD countries the
variation in welfare changes due to technology is somewhat smaller, with a range
of about 5 percentage points. However, for the non-OECD countries, technology
changes have a similar dispersion of welfare impact as trade opening. The gains
from trade have a standard deviation of 6.79%, and a range of about 33%. The
welfare impact of technology changes has a standard deviation of 6.62%, and a
range of nearly 50 percentage points. In addition, while gains from trade are –
of course – always positive, the welfare impact of technological changes takes on
both positive and negative values.
From the perspective of the trade literature, the preceding welfare assessment
is non-standard in one respect. The standard practice in international trade
is to keep the factor supply inelastic and fixed. Our model, however, features
endogenous capital accumulation. Thus, as comparative advantage remains fixed
from the 1960s to today, each country has different income in each decade in
the counterfactual compared to the baseline. While the baseline analysis – by
construction – matches perfectly the evolution of the capital stock in each country
and decade, the counterfactual capital stocks will differ from their observed values.
If a country that keeps its comparative advantage fixed has higher income in each
decade and accumulates more capital, that will have an independent effect on
welfare in addition to the static impact of relative productivity. Similarly, to
compute the gains from trade relative to autarky, the analysis above assumes
that each country is in autarky in each decade starting in the 1960s. Lower
income in each decade implies lower capital stock in the future decades, and that
will impact the welfare at the end of the period.
To check the importance of this mechanism, we repeat the welfare counterfac-
tuals, but this time assuming that capital is the same as in the baseline. This
corresponds to the traditional thought experiment in the trade literature. The
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results are reported in the bottom panel of Table B5. Without endogenous adjust-
ment of capital, the welfare impact of changes in comparative advantage is smaller
throughout. Now, the OECD welfare is only 0.8% higher in the global counter-
factual compared to the baseline, and the non-OECD welfare is 0.5% higher. The
welfare impact is similarly closer to zero in the single-country counterfactual.
As a side note, it is interesting to compare the gains from trade figures. The
gains from trade to the OECD are now 3.95% at the median, or 30% lower than
with capital adjustment. The non-OECD median gains are 23% lower. Thus, as
frequently suggested, trade opening can have a dynamic impact on factor accu-
mulation that will add to the gains from trade. In our case, the dynamic impact
is on the accumulation of capital.
VI. Conclusion
How does technology evolve over time, and what are the consequences of tech-
nological change? In the growth literature, it is widely recognized that economic
growth is driven in large part by productivity growth, making it the key force
for improvements in welfare. However, when relative technology differences are
a source of international trade as in the Ricardian world, the welfare impact of
technological progress depends on which sectors grow in which countries.
This paper starts by estimating sectoral productivity in a sample of some 72
countries, 19 sectors, and 5 decades, 1960s to today. We document a striking
pattern in the data: in the world as a whole, comparative advantage is getting
weaker over time. This effect is present in all time periods and major country
groups: within a country, sectors with the lowest initial relative productivity expe-
rience systematically faster productivity growth than sectors with highest initial
productivity. Using counterfactual experiments, we show that had comparative
advantage not changed in this way, global trade volumes would be higher, trade
shares more dissimilar across countries, and intra-industry trade lower.
This empirical finding opens the door to the theoretical possibility that this
type of uneven technological progress can actually reduce welfare in the trading
countries. We indeed find that welfare was reduced by weakening comparative
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advantage. The average impact is on the same order of magnitude as the total
gains from trade for these countries in the 2000s.
The focus of this paper is on measuring how comparative advantage has evolved,
and quantifying the impact of this evolution. This exercise leaves open the ques-
tion of what are the forces driving technological progress and diffusion across
countries at the sectoral level. One direction of future research will explore the
theoretical mechanisms that could endogenize the patterns uncovered here. The
other direction will identify empirically the factors that can account for the evolu-
tion of comparative advantage, such as import or export competition, the nature
of trading partners, industrial policy, and so on. These two directions are com-
plementary and fruitful avenues for future research.
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A. Comparison of Estimated T ’s with Measured TFP
This Appendix compares the productivity estimates obtained by our procedure
and used throughout the paper with estimates of measured TFP that can be ob-
tained directly. Computing sectoral measured TFP requires data on total output,
employment, capital stocks, and intermediate input usage, all in real terms, by
sector. This information is only available at sector level and on a consistent ba-
sis for many countries through the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database.
We first compute sectoral capital stocks using data on real investment and the
perpetual inventory method.15 We then proceed to compute sector-level mea-
sured TFP from data on total output, employment, capital, and inputs following
equation (8), for all the countries for which the required data are available. The
set of countries and sectors for which this measured TFP can be computed is not
large. There are only 12 countries with all the required data in at least some
sectors: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and United States.16 The data are in principle
available for the period 1970-2008, though in practice earlier years are often not
available in individual countries.
It is now well understood that differences in trade openness across sectors will
affect measured TFP systematically (see Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia, 2013, and
Section III.B). To go from measured TFP to true underlying TFP, we apply the
Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013) correction specified for the U.S. in equation
(9) to all countries and sectors.
We then correlate the TFP values estimated based on STAN with the T ’s from
our baseline procedure. We present the comparison for the 2000s, as the latest
time period has the largest number of observations, and the measures of capital
stocks are also more reliable. Panel A of Table A6 reports, for each sector, the
Spearman rank correlation between the two measures. These tend to be high:
the mean correlation correlations across sectors is 0.71, and the median 0.80.
The last column reports the number of countries for which STAN-based TFP is
15Though the STAN database contains a variable for sectoral capital stock, it is only available for 6
countries.
16In practice, the main bottleneck appears to be data on investment, and therefore capital stocks.
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available in each sector. We can see that we have have information for less than
10 countries per sector. To make more efficient use of the data, we next pool the
sectors and examine the correlation between the two productivity measures in a
regression framework:
log TFP-STANjn = β log
(
T jn
)1/θ
+ δn + δj + nj ,
where TFP-STANjn is the TFP as implied by the STAN data, and T
j
n is as defined
in the rest of the paper. The specification includes both country and sector effects,
and thus the average productivity levels in individual countries and sectors are
netted out. Panel B of Table A6 reports the results. The first column reports
the simple bivariate regression of the two measures. The coefficient is highly
statistically significant. The correlation between the two variables is 0.37. The
second column adds sector effects. The coefficient remains statistically significant
at the 1% level, and the partial correlation, obtained after netting the sector
effects from both measures of productivity, is much higher at 0.583. Finally,
column (3) includes both sector and country effects. The coefficient of interest is
significant at the 5% level. With country and sector fixed effects, the overall R2 is
about 0.89. Given that, it is remarkable that the partial correlation between the
two measures, after controlling for both country and sector effects is 0.08. Thus,
even after netting out all the sector and country effects, the association between
these two variables is close and statistically significant.
We conclude from these exercises that our estimation procedure that relies on
bilateral trade to measure productivity delivers results that are in line with the
more conventional approaches.17
17An alternative source of sector-level productivity estimates is the Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre Productivity Level Database (http://www.ggdc.net/databases/levels.htm). These data are
available only at a single point in time, 1997. The database reports levels of multifactor productivity
relative to the U.S. for 12 manufacturing sectors and 19 developed countries. We repeated the analysis
above using the Groningen data instead. Though the sector-level correlations were somewhat lower than
what is reported for STAN, the coefficients from the fixed effects regression were more significant, and
the Partial R2 comparable to that for STAN.
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B. Solution Algorithm
A model period is one decade. The calibration and estimation yields the follow-
ing series: (i) country-specific and time-varying series {Lnt, T jnt, ξnt, δnt, snt, djnit}
for 5 decades; and (ii) time-invariant parameters common across countries and
decades {ε, η, θ, ωj , αj , βj , γj′j}. The capital stocks in the initial decade are Kn0.
We assume that the model economy is in steady state from fifth period (the last
period of the data) onward by setting the time-varying series at their fifth decade
values for all t > 5 in each country n. We compute the competitive equilibrium
of the model for each period as follows:
1) Guess {wnt, rnt}Nn=1.
• Compute prices from the following equations:
cjnt =
(
w
αj
nt r
1−αj
nt
)βj J+1∏
j′=1
(
pj
′
nt
)γj′j1−βj for all n and j,
Φjnt =
N∑
i=1
T jit
(
cjitd
j
nit
)−θ
for all n and j ∈ {1, ..., J},
ΦJ+1nt = T
J+1
nt
(
cJ+1nt
)−θ
for all n,
pjnt = Γ
(
Φjnt
)− 1
θ
for all n and j,
Pnt = Bn
 J∑
j=1
ωj(p
j
nt)
1−η
 11−η ξnt (pJ+1nt )1−ξnt for all n.
• Compute final demand as follows: for any country n,
Y jnt = ξnt
wntLnt + rntKnt
pjnt
ωj(p
j
nt)
1−η∑J
k=1 ωk(p
k
nt)
1−η , for j = {1, .., J},
Y J+1nt = (1− ξnt)
wntLnt + rntKnt
pJ+1nt
.
• Compute consumption, investment and next-period capital: for any country
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n,
Cnt = (1− snt)Ynt; Int = sntYnt; Knt+1 = (1− δnt)Knt + Int.
• Compute the trade shares as follows: for any country pair (n, i) and j ∈
{1, ..., J}
pijnit =
T jit
(
cjitd
j
nit
)−θ
Φjnt
.
• Compute total demand as follows: for any country n and any sector j
pjntY
j
nt+
J∑
j′=1
(
N∑
i=1
Qj
′
itp
j′
itpi
j′
int)(1−βj′)γjj′+QJ+1nt pJ+1nt (1−βJ+1)γj,J+1 = pjntQjnt.
• Compute the factor allocations across sectors as follows: for any country n,
N∑
i=1
pjitQ
j
itpi
j
int =
wntL
j
nt
αjβj
=
rntK
j
nt
(1− αj)βj , for all j = {1, .., J},
pJ+1nt Q
J+1
nt =
wntL
J+1
nt
αJ+1βJ+1
=
rntK
J+1
nt
(1− αJ+1)βJ+1 .
2) Update {w′nt, r′nt}Nn=1 with the feasibility conditions for factors: for any n,
J+1∑
j=1
Ljnt = Lnt,
J+1∑
j=1
Kjnt = Knt.
3) Repeat the above procedures until {w′nt, r′nt}Nn=1 is close enough to {wnt, rnt}Nn=1.
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Table B1—Summary Statistics
OECD Non-OECD
Mean CV Countries Mean CV Countries
T 1/θ T 1/θ T 1/θ T 1/θ
1960s 0.911 0.128 21 0.474 0.241 31
1970s 1.048 0.110 21 0.571 0.216 35
1980s 0.986 0.110 22 0.586 0.222 39
1990s 1.041 0.103 22 0.553 0.209 50
2000s 1.028 0.108 22 0.585 0.212 50
Balanced Panel of Countries
1960s 0.911 0.128 21 0.474 0.241 31
1970s 1.048 0.110 21 0.591 0.214 31
1980s 0.973 0.110 21 0.586 0.219 31
1990s 1.031 0.102 21 0.560 0.215 31
2000s 1.026 0.109 21 0.553 0.224 31
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the average productivity relative to the US (mean T 1/θ), the
coefficient of variation among tradeable sector productivities (CV T 1/θ), as well as the number of countries for which
data are available. The samples are split by decade and into OECD and non-OECD groups.
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Table B3—The Fit of the Baseline Model with the Data
model data
Wages:
mean 0.464 0.400
median 0.277 0.172
corr(model, data) 0.952
Return to capital:
mean 0.173 0.172
median 0.160 0.154
corr(model, data) 0.588
pijnn:
mean 0.638 0.570
median 0.710 0.614
corr(model, data) 0.922
pijni, i 6= j:
mean 0.0051 0.0060
median 0.0002 0.0002
corr(model, data) 0.904
Notes: This table reports the means and medians of wages relative to the U.S. (top panel); return to capital relative
to the U.S. (second panel), share of domestically produced goods in overall spending (third panel), and share of goods
from country i in overall spending (bottom panel) in the model and in the data. Wages and return to capital in the
data are calculated as described in Section III.C.
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Table B4—Trade Volumes and Trade Patterns in the Data and in the Model
Model
Data Benchmark CF: CF:
Global Single-
Country
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Imports/GDP 0.241 0.242 0.279 0.270
ρ(Model,Data) 0.593 0.552 0.523
∆σ(ln World Export Shares) -0.322 -0.283 -0.138 ..
ρ(Model,Data) 0.600 0.373 ..
∆σ(ln S) -0.063 -0.058 -0.052 ..
ρ(Model,Data) 0.825 0.474 ..
∆ GL Index 0.162 0.111 0.021 -0.076
ρ(Model,Data) 0.423 0.185 0.184
Notes: This table compares the 2000s trade volumes and trade patterns in the data, the benchmark model, and the
counterfactuals. The columns labeled “CF” refer to the counterfactuals. The row “∆σ(ln World Export Shares)”
presents the change in the standard deviation of log world export shares between the 1960s and the 2000s, averaged
across sectors. The row “∆σ(ln S)” presents the change in the standard deviation of log estimated Sjnt’s between the
1960s and the 2000s, averaged across sectors. The row “∆ GL Index” reports the change in the Grubel-Lloyd index,
averaged across countries and sectors.
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Table B5—Welfare Gains in the Counterfactuals Relative to Baseline
Median St. Dev. Min Max Countries
Main Results
Global counterfactual
OECD 1.26 1.34 -1.14 4.27 22
Non-OECD 1.80 6.62 -4.60 41.93 50
Single-country counterfactual
OECD 2.16 1.45 -0.40 5.45
Non-OECD 2.68 7.51 -4.93 45.84
NB : Overall gains from trade
OECD 5.64 3.27 1.50 13.09
Non-OECD 7.22 6.79 1.41 34.46
Fixed Capital
Global counterfactual
OECD 0.80 0.92 -1.03 2.80 22
Non-OECD 0.49 4.68 -5.80 27.56 50
Single-country counterfactual
OECD 1.39 1.04 -0.31 3.65
Non-OECD 1.77 5.34 -3.68 30.50
NB : Overall gains from trade
OECD 3.95 2.23 1.16 8.48
Non-OECD 5.61 4.62 1.00 23.98
Notes: Units are in percentage points. This table reports the percent change in welfare under the counterfactual sce-
narios with respect to the baseline. The top panel reports the main results, in which capital accumulation responds
endogenously to comparative advantage. The bottom panel reports the results when capital is fixed at its observed val-
ues. The counterfactuals labeled “Global counterfactual” assume that all countries’ comparative advantage remained
fixed to the 1960s values. The counterfactuals labeled “Single-country counterfactual” assume for each individual
country, comparative advantage remained as it was in the 1960s. All other countries’ comparative advantage is taken
from the data. In the baseline comparative advantage is as it is in the data for the 2000s. The table also reports the
total gains from trade relative to autarky in the baseline for the 2000s.
54
F
ig
u
r
e
B
1
.
A
b
so
l
u
t
e
a
n
d
R
e
l
a
t
iv
e
C
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
n
c
e
EG
Y
IR
L
TT
O
PH
L
SL
V
VE
N
BO
L
JO
R
AU
T
CA
N
GH
A
NZ
L
M
YS
CO
L
IN
D
DN
K
NL
D
FI
N
NO
R
PR
T
LK
A
SW
E
HN
D
ZA
F
AU
S
KE
NFJ
I
IS
R
TU
R
IS
L
CR
I
GB
R
IT
A
CH
L
JP
N
FR
A
UR
Y
BL
X D
EU
KO
R
ES
P
GR
C
EC
U
−.20.2.4.6
6Ln(Average T
1/e
)
−1
.5
−1
−.
5
0
Ln
(In
itia
l A
ve
ra
ge
 T
1/
e )
(a
)
1
9
6
0
s
to
2
0
0
0
s:
A
b
so
lu
te
C
o
n
v
er
g
en
ce
a
n
d
In
it
ia
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
EG
Y
IR
L
TT
O
PH
LSL
V
VE
N
BO
L
SE
N
JO
R
AU
T
CA
N
PE
R
M
EX
GH
A
NZ
L
M
YS
CH
E
CO
L
IN
D
DN
K
NL
DFI
N
CH
N
NO
R
PR
T
LK
A
SW
E
HN
D
ET
H
M
US
AU
S
KE
N
FJ
I
IS
R
TU
R
IS
L
CR
I
GB
R
IT
A
CH
L
JP
N
BR
A
AR
G
FR
A
TW
N
UR
Y
BG
D
BL
X D
EU
KO
R
ES
P
GR
C
EC
U I
DN
RU
S
SV
K
KA
Z
RO
M
SV
N
PO
L
CZ
E
HU
N
UK
R
VN
M
BG
R
−.2−.10.1.2.3
6Ln(Average T
1/e
)
−1
.5
−1
−.
5
0
.5
Ln
(In
itia
l A
ve
ra
ge
 T
1/
e )
(b
)
1
9
9
0
s
to
2
0
0
0
s:
A
b
so
lu
te
C
o
n
v
er
g
en
ce
a
n
d
In
it
ia
l
A
v
er
a
g
e
EG
Y
IR
LTT
O
PH
L
SL
V
VE
N
BO
L
JO
R
AU
T
CA
N
GH
A
NZ
L
M
YS
CO
L
IN
D
DN
KNL
D
FI
NN
ORP
RT
LK
A
SW
E
HN
D
ZA
F
AU
S
KE
N
FJ
I
IS
R
TU
R
IS
L
CR
I
GB
R I
TA
CH
L
JP
N
FR
A
UR
Y
BL
X
DE
U
KO
R
ES
PG
RC
EC
U
.05.15.25.35
Coeff. Var. T
1/e
, 2000s
.0
5
.1
5
.2
5
.3
5
Co
ef
f. 
Va
r. 
T1
/e , 
19
60
s
(c
)
1
9
6
0
s
a
n
d
2
0
0
0
s:
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
o
f
V
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
EG
Y
IR
L
TT
OPH
L
SL
V
VE
N
BO
L
JO
R
AU
T
CA
N
GH
A
NZ
L
M
YS
CO
L
IN
D
DN
K
NL
D
FI
N
NO
R
PR
T
LK
A
SW
E
HN
D
AU
S
KE
N
FJ
I
IS
RT
UR
IS
L
CR
I
GB
R I
TA
CH
L
JP
N
FR
A
UR
Y
BL
X
DE
U
KO
R
ES
P
GR
C
EC
U
.05.15.25.35
Coeff. Var. T
1/e
, 2000s
.0
5
.1
5
.2
5
.3
5
Co
ef
f. 
Va
r. 
T1
/e , 
19
90
s
(d
)
1
9
9
0
s
a
n
d
2
0
0
0
s:
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
o
f
V
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
to
p
p
a
n
el
o
f
th
is
fi
g
u
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
b
iv
a
ri
a
te
p
lo
ts
o
f
a
b
so
lu
te
co
n
v
er
g
en
ce
fr
o
m
th
e
1
9
6
0
s
(l
ef
t
p
a
n
el
)
a
n
d
th
e
1
9
9
0
s
(r
ig
h
t
p
a
n
el
)
a
g
a
in
st
lo
g
in
it
ia
l
a
v
er
a
g
e
T
1
/
θ
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
U
S
.
T
h
e
b
o
tt
o
m
p
a
n
el
p
lo
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
o
f
v
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
in
T
1
/
θ
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
U
S
in
th
e
2
0
0
0
s
a
g
a
in
st
th
is
v
a
lu
e
in
th
e
1
9
6
0
s
(l
ef
t
p
a
n
el
)
a
n
d
th
e
1
9
9
0
s
(r
ig
h
t
p
a
n
el
).
In
th
e
b
o
tt
o
m
2
p
a
n
el
s,
th
e
li
n
e
th
ro
u
g
h
th
e
d
a
ta
is
th
e
4
5
-d
eg
re
e
li
n
e.
55
F
ig
u
r
e
B
2
.
C
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
n
c
e
b
y
S
e
c
t
o
r
,
1
9
6
0
s
t
o
2
0
0
0
s
−.50.51 −.50.51 −.50.51 −.50.51
−2
0
−2
0
−2
0
−2
0
−2
0
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
C
31
A
33
34
A
36
6Log T
Lo
g 
In
itia
l T
Gr
ap
hs
 b
y i
sic
co
de
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
fi
g
u
re
d
is
p
la
y
s
th
e
lo
g
ch
a
n
g
e
in
( Tj n
) 1/θ
a
g
a
in
st
th
e
in
it
ia
l
lo
g
le
v
el
,
a
n
d
th
e
O
L
S
fi
t
th
ro
u
g
h
th
e
d
a
ta
,
fo
r
ea
ch
se
ct
o
r.
56
Figure B3. Convergence in the Pooled Sample, 1960s to 2000s
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Notes: This figure displays partial correlation the log change in
(
T jn
)1/θ
against the initial log level, after netting out
country and sector effects, pooling across sectors and countries.
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Figure B4. Heuristic Evidence: Initial Import Shares, Changes in Import Shares, and Changes
in Trade Costs
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(a) Initial Import Shares and Changes in Import Shares
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(b) Initial Import Shares and Changes in Trade Costs
Notes: This figure plots the change in the import share between the 1960s and 2000s ∆(1 − pijnn) (top panel), and
the percentage change in import-weighted average import costs djni between the 1960 and the 2000s (bottom panel),
against the import share of sector j in country n in the 1960s on the x-axis. The figure pools country-sectors.
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Table A1—Country Coverage
Country Period Country Period
OECD Non-OECD
Australia 1960s−2000s Argentina 1980s−2000s
Austria 1960s−2000s Bangladesh 1970s−2000s
Belgium-Luxembourg 1960s−2000s Bolivia 1960s−2000s
Canada 1960s−2000s Brazil 1980s−2000s
Denmark 1960s−2000s Bulgaria 1990s−2000s
Finland 1960s−2000s Chile 1960s−2000s
France 1960s−2000s China 1970s−2000s
Germany 1960s−2000s Colombia 1960s−2000s
Greece 1960s−2000s Costa Rica 1960s−2000s
Iceland 1960s−2000s Czech Republic 1990s−2000s
Ireland 1960s−2000s Ecuador 1960s−2000s
Italy 1960s−2000s Egypt, Arab Rep. 1960s−2000s
Japan 1960s−2000s El Salvador 1960s−2000s
Netherlands 1960s−2000s Ethiopia 1980s−2000s
New Zealand 1960s−2000s Fiji 1960s−2000s
Norway 1960s−2000s Ghana 1960s−2000s
Portugal 1960s−2000s Guatemala 1960s−2000s
Spain 1960s−2000s Honduras 1960s−2000s
Sweden 1960s−2000s Hungary 1990s−2000s
Switzerland 1980s−2000s India 1960s−2000s
United Kingdom 1960s−2000s Indonesia 1960s−2000s
United States 1960s−2000s Israel 1960s−2000s
Jordan 1960s−2000s
Kazakhstan 1990s−2000s
Kenya 1960s−2000s
Korea, Rep. 1960s−2000s
Malaysia 1960s−2000s
Mauritius 1960s−2000s
Mexico 1960s−2000s
Nigeria 1960s−2000s
Pakistan 1960s−2000s
Peru 1980s−2000s
Philippines 1960s−2000s
Poland 1990s−2000s
Romania 1990s−2000s
Russian Federation 1990s−2000s
Senegal 1970s−2000s
Slovak Republic 1990s−2000s
Slovenia 1990s−2000s
South Africa 1960s−2000s
Sri Lanka 1960s−2000s
Taiwan Province of China 1970s−2000s
Tanzania 1960s−2000s
Thailand 1960s−2000s
Trinidad and Tobago 1960s−2000s
Turkey 1960s−2000s
Ukraine 1990s−2000s
Uruguay 1960s−2000s
Venezuela, RB 1960s−2000s
Vietnam 1990s−2000s
Notes: This table reports the countries in the sample and the decades for which data are available for each country.
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Table A2—Sectors
ISIC code Sector Name αj βj γJ+1,j ωj
15 Food and Beverages 0.315 0.281 0.300 0.155
16 Tobacco Products 0.264 0.520 0.527 0.026
17 Textiles 0.467 0.371 0.295 0.016
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 0.493 0.377 0.319 0.124
19 Leather, Leather Products, Footwear 0.485 0.359 0.329 0.025
20 Wood Products (Excl. Furniture) 0.452 0.372 0.288 0.007
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.366 0.344 0.386 0.010
22 Printing and Publishing 0.484 0.469 0.407 0.005
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel 0.244 0.243 0.245 0.087
24 Chemical and Chemical Products 0.308 0.373 0.459 0.006
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 0.385 0.387 0.345 0.011
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.365 0.459 0.479 0.076
27 Basic Metals 0.381 0.299 0.443 0.002
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.448 0.398 0.363 0.014
29C Office, Accounting, Computing, and Other Mach. 0.473 0.390 0.388 0.070
31A Electrical Machinery, Communication Equipment 0.405 0.380 0.416 0.041
33 Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments 0.456 0.428 0.441 0.059
34A Transport Equipment 0.464 0.343 0.286 0.188
36 Furniture and Other Manufacturing 0.460 0.407 0.395 0.080
4A Nontradeables 0.561 0.651 0.772
Mean 0.414 0.393 0.394 0.053
Min 0.244 0.243 0.245 0.002
Max 0.561 0.651 0.772 0.188
Notes: This table reports the sectors used in the analysis. The classification corresponds to the ISIC Revision 3
2-digit, aggregated further due to data availability. αj is the value-added based labor intensity; βj is the share of
value added in total output; γJ+1,j is the share of nontradeable inputs in total intermediate inputs; ωj is the taste
parameter for tradeable sector j, estimated using the procedure described in Section III.B. Variable definitions and
sources are described in detail in the text.
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Table A3—Country-by-Country Estimates of Relative Convergence, 1960s to 2000s
Country β s.e. Obs. R2 Speed of Convergence,
by decade
United Kingdom -0.412** 0.186 19 0.258 0.133
Austria -0.551 0.381 19 0.144 0.200
Belgium-Luxembourg -0.760*** 0.136 19 0.608 0.356
Denmark -0.695*** 0.194 19 0.443 0.297
France -0.817*** 0.198 19 0.603 0.424
Germany -0.644*** 0.116 19 0.558 0.258
Italy -0.532*** 0.145 19 0.442 0.190
Netherlands -0.583** 0.219 19 0.295 0.219
Norway -0.985*** 0.137 19 0.725 1.047
Sweden -0.668*** 0.165 18 0.482 0.276
Canada -0.147 0.230 19 0.016 0.040
Japan -0.885*** 0.164 18 0.698 0.540
Finland -0.720*** 0.166 19 0.641 0.318
Greece -0.299*** 0.086 19 0.318 0.089
Iceland -0.425* 0.229 15 0.295 0.138
Ireland -0.706* 0.335 19 0.274 0.306
Portugal -0.490*** 0.146 19 0.352 0.168
Spain -0.493*** 0.102 19 0.558 0.170
Turkey -0.445*** 0.104 18 0.591 0.147
Australia -0.567*** 0.150 19 0.499 0.209
New Zealand -0.247** 0.106 19 0.301 0.071
South Africa -0.014 0.229 18 0.000 0.004
Bolivia -0.266** 0.102 17 0.260 0.077
Chile -0.143 0.104 19 0.065 0.039
Colombia -0.237 0.139 19 0.180 0.067
Costa Rica -0.511*** 0.165 17 0.394 0.179
Ecuador -0.245*** 0.072 19 0.323 0.070
El Salvador -0.247 0.145 18 0.103 0.071
Honduras -0.415** 0.167 17 0.288 0.134
Mexico -0.462** 0.161 13 0.331 0.155
Uruguay -0.319** 0.116 19 0.252 0.096
Venezuela, RB -0.401*** 0.133 19 0.463 0.128
Trinidad and Tobago -0.191 0.376 17 0.034 0.053
Israel -0.457*** 0.147 18 0.302 0.153
Jordan -0.476** 0.188 18 0.252 0.161
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.299** 0.113 19 0.140 0.089
Sri Lanka 0.039 0.171 19 0.003 -0.009
India -0.249* 0.126 19 0.153 0.072
Indonesia -0.590*** 0.099 16 0.706 0.223
Korea, Rep. -0.688*** 0.110 19 0.780 0.291
Malaysia -0.584*** 0.121 19 0.421 0.219
Pakistan -0.389** 0.147 8 0.343 0.123
Philippines -0.558*** 0.185 19 0.382 0.204
Thailand -0.898*** 0.268 14 0.541 0.571
Ghana 0.016 0.200 18 0.000 -0.004
Kenya -0.047 0.144 17 0.005 0.012
Mauritius -0.275 0.201 15 0.120 0.080
Tanzania -0.533*** 0.162 12 0.410 0.190
Fiji -0.299* 0.148 15 0.156 0.089
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered in parentheses; ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant
at 10%. This table reports the results of regressing the growth of estimated technology parameter
(
T jn
)1/θ
over the
period from the 1960s to the 2000s on its initial value, by country. The speed of convergence, per decade, is reported
in the last column. Missing values are due to the convergence coefficient being larger than 1.
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Table A4—Comparison of Estimates of T jn
Method Mean St. Dev. Corr w/baseline β s.e.(β)
Baseline 0.737 0.275 .. -0.517*** (0.044)
Additional gravity 0.728 0.270 0.999 -0.518*** (0.045)
Poisson 0.720 0.271 0.969 -0.534*** (0.046)
imjnt in d
j
nit 0.527 0.240 0.890 -0.339*** (0.051)
r: Caselli-Feyrer 0.702 0.295 0.989 -0.487*** (0.046)
r: Euler 0.694 0.265 0.954 -0.539*** (0.047)
r: Direct 0.744 0.273 0.910 -0.541*** (0.145)
r: Fin. Integration 0.682 0.264 0.960 -0.519*** (0.046)
Country-Specific IO 0.766 0.267 0.987 -0.480*** (0.042)
Country-Specific IO, α, β 0.805 0.272 0.903 -0.646*** (0.043)
θ = 4 0.726 0.352 0.942 -0.600*** (0.045)
θ Sector-Specific 0.749 0.350 0.870 -0.691*** (0.047)
Notes: This table the results of comparing the baseline estimates of T jn to alternative estimation approaches. The first
and second columns report the mean and the standard deviation of
(
T jn
)1/θ
relative to the US. The third column
reports the correlation between the baseline
(
T jn
)1/θ
relative to the US and the alternative estimate. The fourth and
fifth columns report the coefficient and standard errors from estimating the convergence regression (10) using each
set of
(
T jn
)1/θ
estimates.
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Table A5—Zero Trade Observations: Model vs. Data
Sector Name ISIC code 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
All Sectors Combined 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.009
Food and Beverages 15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tobacco Products 16 0.075 0.100 0.015 0.015 0.026
Textiles 17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005
Wearing Apparel, Fur 18 0.011 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.004
Leather, Leather Products, Footwear 19 0.011 0.016 0.028 0.001 0.031
Wood Products (Excl. Furniture) 20 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Paper and Paper Products 21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Printing and Publishing 22 0.017 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.009
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel 23 0.003 0.003 0.023 0.008 0.011
Chemical and Chemical Products 24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
Rubber and Plastics Products 25 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Basic Metals 27 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011
Fabricated Metal Products 28 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.020
Office, Accounting, Computing, and Other Mach. 29C 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Electrical Machinery, Communication Equipment 31A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments 33 0.022 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.023
Transport Equipment 34A 0.012 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.011
Furniture and Other Manufacturing 36 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.002 0.012
Notes: This table reports the share of global absorption taken up by importer-exporter-sector observations for which
actual imports are zero in the data.
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Table A6—Comparison to Measured TFP from STAN Database
Panel A: Sector-by-Sector Rank Correlations
ISIC code Sector Name Correlation Countries
15 Food and Beverages 0.8000 4
16 Tobacco Products 1.0000 4
17 Textiles 0.9000 5
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 0.1000 5
19 Leather, Leather Products, Footwear -0.2000 5
20 Wood Products (Excl. Furniture) 0.4524 8
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.9429 6
22 Printing and Publishing 1.0000 6
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel 0.6000 6
24 Chemical and Chemical Products 0.7500 7
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 0.8095 8
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.6833 9
27 Basic Metals 0.6571 6
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.9429 6
29C Office, Accounting, Computing, and Other Machinery 0.8095 8
31A Electrical Machinery, Communication Equipment 1.0000 5
33 Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments 0.7714 6
34A Transport Equipment 0.4857 6
36 Furniture and Other Manufacturing 0.9000 5
Panel B: Fixed Effects Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var: Log Sectoral Productivity Implied by Sectoral Measured TFP
log
(
T jn
)1/θ
0.656*** 1.030*** 0.532**
(0.126) (0.126) (0.228)
Observations 115 115 115
R-squared 0.137 0.556 0.885
Partial ρ 0.370 0.349 0.084
Sector FE no yes yes
Country FE no no yes
Notes: This table reports the results of comparing the productivity estimates using the main procedure adopted in the paper
(
(
T jn
)1/θ
) with TFP estimated directly using production data from the OECD STAN database. Panel A reports the Spearman
rank correlations of the two alternative productivity measures by sector. Panel B reports the results of a fixed effects regression
of directly measured TFP from STAN on
(
T jn
)1/θ
. In Panel B, robust standard errors in parentheses; **: significant at 5%;
***: significant at 1%. “Partial ρ” is the partial correlation between the right-hand side and the left-hand side variables, after
netting out the fixed effects included in the column.
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